PROJECT ON CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION AND INTER-GROUP RECONCILIATION IN INDONESIA:

REPORT EXTRACTS ON PHASE I (FUNDED BY USASID)

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I. PROJECT OVERVIEW

DRAFT PROJECT DESCRIPTION

The purpose of the project is to strengthen Indonesia's capacity to manage complex inter-group conflicts, including those based on religion, race, and ethnicity, in ways that address the underlying causes of the conflicts, reflect the values, needs, and interests of the conflicting parties, and contribute to lasting peace. This will be accomplished by a project team of Indonesian professionals working in partnership with four US-based conflict management professionals. The project is envisioned as a multi-year project, in which the project team will focus on building capacity in three inter-related areas: skills, institutions, and networks.

Skills: The cornerstone of the project is the development of a cadre of Indonesian professionals who will become the country’s experts in the management of complex inter-group conflict and eventually train and mentor other Indonesians in inter-group conflict management. To achieve this, the project team will:

1) Identify and convene a core group of Indonesian professionals who will become facilitators and trainers in complex inter-group conflict management. The project team will identify people who have conflict management, facilitation, and/or other relevant training and experience, who are interested in inter-group conflict management, and who have the experience, skill, and commitment to be effective facilitating inter-group dialogues and training others in inter-group conflict management. The core group will be as diverse as possible in order to ensure the legitimacy of the project and the acceptability of the facilitators.

2) Engage the core group of facilitators/trainers in a series of in-depth training workshops on the theory and practice of inter-group conflict management. The
training workshops, which will address both violence prevention and post-conflict peace building, will be highly interactive, drawing on the experience and insights of the participants. They will include exploration of traditional Indonesian approaches to conflict management, discussion of approaches used effectively in other parts of the world, and identification of ways of adapting some of those approaches to the Indonesian context. The first half-day training workshops were held in July, and a three- or four-day intensive training workshop is scheduled for late November or early December. In preparation for the November/December training, the project team will develop initial training materials. As the project progresses and the team receives feedback on the materials, they will be revised, translated into Indonesian and incorporated into a training manual.

3) **Provide opportunities for the core group to observe inter-group dialogue workshops co-facilitated by experienced Indonesian facilitators and US-based conflict management professionals.** This will serve as an extension of the training and allow the core group to observe and discuss effective facilitation of inter-group dialogues. A dialogue observation is planned for December, if possible directly following the training workshop. These dialogues will generally fall within a “Second Track” approach to inter-group conflict management, emphasizing the role of civil society, but will be adapted to the Indonesian context, and may lead to official or “First Track” negotiations. In addition to their training value, the dialogue workshops will serve as a bridge to one or more of the ongoing pilot projects. For logistical and financial reasons, the observation will take place in Jakarta.

4) **Involve some of the core group as co-facilitators in the pilot projects.** This will provide opportunities for members of the core group to be mentored in the facilitation of inter-group dialogues. It will also build conflict management skills at the local level. The project team will develop two pilot projects, each of which will be co-facilitated by a team that will include: one to three Indonesians from the core group who have participated in the training workshops; one to three local people who may not have facilitation experience, but who understand the parties and issues and are acceptable to the parties; one to two US-based professionals with experience in the management of complex inter-group conflicts. The project team will determine the specific role(s) of the US-based team members and they will stay involved only until the Indonesian members of the facilitation team can work effectively without them.

**Institutions:** To ensure that conflict management capacity building continues in the long term, the project team will work to support the development of a wide range of non-governmental conflict management institutions at the national, regional, and local levels. Initially, the project team will focus on establishing a non-governmental organization (NGO) which will be responsible for implementing project goals nationally, and will also support the development of a university center to do related research and teaching. Both
organizations will be encouraged to collaborate in the development of their programs and in the establishment of additional institutions according to need in different parts of Indonesia.

1) **Conflict Management NGO:** The project team will work to develop an NGO that specializes in various aspects of conflict management, including the management of complex inter-group conflicts. The NGO will engage in policy development, training, and conflict management projects, in collaboration with other interested organizations.

2) **Center on Inter-Group Relations and Conflict Management at the University of Indonesia.** The project team will collaborate with the Faculty of Social and Political Science at the University of Indonesia to support the creation of a university-wide Center on Inter-Group Relations and Conflict Management. The Center will establish and maintain a resource center available to the public, develop and offer graduate level courses, engage in interdisciplinary research, support the professional development of university faculty involved with the Center, engage in public education, and collaborate with other universities and NGOs involved in related work.

**Networks:** In order to leverage the talents and efforts of the many institutions and individuals involved in conflict management and peace building, the project team will work to develop overlapping, non-hierarchical networks of institutions and individuals involved in various aspects of inter-group conflict management. Initially, the network-building efforts will involve two principal sets of activities, one at the national level and one at the local level.

1) **Forum on Complex Inter-Group Conflict Management:** The project team will establish a forum of institutions and individuals with interest and/or experience in the management of complex inter-group conflict. The forum will provide leadership, strategic planning, and networking related to the project and other conflict management initiatives.

2) **Two pilot projects on facilitated inter-group dialogue:** The project team will undertake two pilot projects at the local level. At least one of the pilot projects will focus on post-conflict reconciliation in a community that has experienced violent conflict. The other project may focus on violence prevention. (See Section III on Site Evaluations.) They will involve some combination of facilitated inter-group dialogue and joint action. The pilots will serve as models for the development of similar initiatives in other locations, and will eventually be integrated into a non-hierarchical network of institutions and initiatives at the local, regional, and national levels.
II. ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED

In Phase I, the project team focused on building networks of individuals and institutions with experience and/or interest in conflict management, using these networks to share information about conflict management in Indonesia and other parts of the world, and developing the plans and process for project implementation. In all three of these areas, there were important achievements that will contribute the success of future phases and the long-term impact of the project. There were also some problems, and
areas in which we have not yet achieved the desired results. Given the importance of learning from experiences with conflict management, as well as the challenges involved in evaluating conflict management projects, we offer the following principles to guide current and future analyses:

- The “success” of any conflict management project must be measured against the goals and objectives established jointly by the conflict management professionals and the communities to be served. In complex, long-term capacity-building projects, these goals and objectives should not remain static, but should be constantly reexamined and modified in light of the experiences and needs of those involved.

- Conflict management capacity building in societies torn by violent conflict is a long-term process that requires sustained commitment by all involved, through many ups and downs. Therefore, the effectiveness of any given phase of a capacity-building project must ultimately be measured in the context of its long-term benefits to the community or communities served.

- While conflict management professionals can and should engage in evaluation of the effectiveness of their efforts, they can only provide one piece of the picture. Evaluation of conflict management capacity building also must take account of the perceived value of the project to the participants and communities served, as well as concrete evidence of positive change resulting from the project.

In the following pages, we provide an overview of what went well, where we had difficulties, and what lessons we learned in Phase I. We also highlight implications for future phases. Our analysis is organized according to the three broad objectives identified above: building networks, sharing information, and project implementation.

### Building Networks

One of the most striking early achievements of Phase I has been the establishment of informal networks for ongoing information sharing and collaborative action related to inter-group conflict management and peace building. In future phases, it will be important to continue to support and expand these networks, while building a more structured, non-hierarchical, national network of individuals and institutions involved in various aspects of inter-group conflict management and peace building.

During Phase I, the project team spent a significant amount of time engaging in formal and informal networking with individuals and institutions (governmental and nongovernmental.) This was based on our understanding that successful capacity building
does not start from scratch, but builds on the base of skills, experience, and networks that already exist in the society. Our specific objectives for networking in Phase I were:

1. To develop an Indonesia-based project team with the skill, interest, and commitment to lead the project;
2. To develop a broader group of individuals and institutions, reflective of the diversity of Indonesian society, that will provide ongoing leadership for the project, and to whom the project team will be accountable;
3. To identify a small pool of individuals with prior training and/or experience in other aspects of conflict management, who have the skill, experience and interest to become experts in inter-group conflict management;
4. To begin to develop an informal, non-hierarchical, and self-sustaining network of individuals and organizations involved in various aspects of conflict management and peace building, for ongoing information sharing and collaborative action.

1. **Project Team**

Before the start of Phase I, those of us who had been involved in IRIS’ earlier work in Indonesia (Indonesian\(^1\) and US-based\(^2\)) recognized the value of expanding the institutional and experiential diversity of the project team. Therefore, we brought in two conflict management professionals from a US-based NGO with several years of experience conducting conflict management training in Indonesia\(^3\) (primarily focused on basic conflict management skill building and environmental conflict management) as well as their principal Indonesian partners\(^4\), from an NGO with significant experience with alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and environmental conflict management. Towards the end of Phase I, we collectively added a representative from another Indonesian NGO, who had developed plans for a national network of facilitators and trainers to provide ongoing conflict management services throughout the country.\(^5\) This process has resulted in a project team with highly complementary knowledge, skills, experience, and networks, and the commitment to sustain the project over the long term.

2. **National Forum**

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1 Emil Salim, former Minister of Environment, founder of Yayasan Kehati, and Professor of Economics, University of Indonesia; Chusnul Mar’iyah, Professor of Political Science, University of Indonesia, and prominent activist.
2 John Davies, Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland; Andrea Strimling, International and Dispute Resolution Services, Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.
3 Chris Moore and Peter Woodrow, CDR Associates.
4 Mas Achmad Santosa and Wiwiek Awiati, Indonesian Center for Environmental Law.
5 Nena Soeprapto, Institute for Democracy Education.
Although we succeeded in expanding the experiential diversity of the project team, the project still lacks the institutional and demographic diversity necessary for broad legitimacy in Indonesia. During Phase I, the team agreed to establish a national forum, comprised of institutions and individuals with interest in inter-group conflict management, which will provide ongoing direction for the project and accountability for project management. Despite intentions to move quickly in establishing the forum, the process has been delayed because of the need for careful, informed decisions about how to select forum members, what the forum’s institutional structure should be, and how it should be funded. As we write this report, the Indonesian team members are evaluating the results of a questionnaire sent to many institutions and individuals (more than will likely become members of the forum). Having obtained supplementary funding from UNDP-EU for the purpose (see Section VI), they are in the process of convening an exploratory meeting for the forum in November. Out of this meeting, we hope to develop an initial list of forum members as well as plans for the formal development of the forum.

3. Facilitator Pool

During Phase I, the team members drew on our respective networks to identify individuals with prior training and/or experience in other aspects of conflict management, for advanced training in inter-group facilitation. We convened two orientations and training workshops, attended by over thirty people with a wide range of conflict management and peace building experience. During these workshops, we engaged the participants in discussions about their experience with conflict management and peace building, approaches to inter-group conflict management from Indonesia and other parts of the world, and project plans. We also involved the participants in developing preliminary lists of criteria for selecting facilitators for inter-group conflict management dialogues (see Section V). The Indonesian team members then used the criteria, and their knowledge of many of the participants, to identify a smaller pool of candidates for more advanced training (see Section V).

4. National Network

One of the most striking achievements of Phase I has been the establishment of informal networks for ongoing information sharing and collaborative action. This was particularly evident during workshop on July 31, 1999, in which we brought together over twenty-five people with a wide range of experience in various aspects of conflict management and peace building (see attached participant list, Section IV). Although the stated goals of the workshop were skills building and project planning, the meeting was the first time known to the project team when people with conflict management experience from around the country were able to share experiences and perspectives. This was an important step in establishing a national, non-hierarchical network of individuals and institutions working to manage inter-group conflicts and build peace in their communities.
Although significant progress has been made in building the national network, much work remains to be done. USAID-OTI in Jakarta has developed a valuable inventory of conflict management organizations and projects around Indonesia (see Section VII), which we are using in our networking process. While the US-based team members were in Indonesia, they contacted several of the organizations to share information and ideas. The networking process has continued since then, with the Indonesian team members participating in a networking meeting convened by the British Council, and taking the lead in convening a November meeting of interested organizations and individuals (with UNDP-EU support), and the US-based team members continuing to network via e-mail and telephone. We will continue to build on this base during Phase II.

Information Sharing

The project team has succeeded in establishing a valuable ongoing dialogue about conflict management theory and practice, traditional Indonesian approaches to conflict management, specific conflict situations in Indonesia, and current efforts to manage those conflicts. One of the most important results of our information sharing in Phase I has been the change in the dialogue about inter-group conflict in Indonesia from one based on perceived powerlessness to active analysis and action planning.

Throughout Phase I, the project team used the networking process to establish a two-way dialogue with people from a wide range of professional backgrounds and demographic groups. We saw this as particularly important, given the lack of awareness within Indonesian society of the range of approaches that exist for managing inter-group conflict. Our specific objectives for information sharing in Phase I were:

1. To share information about the range of approaches for violence prevention, inter-group reconciliation, societal peace building, and strengthening of democratic culture that have been used successfully in other parts of the world;
2. To discuss traditional approaches to conflict management in Indonesia and explore the strengths and weaknesses of those approaches in the context of current inter-group conflicts;
3. To gather information about specific local conflicts, develop criteria for selecting pilot project sites, and identify potential sites;
4. To inspire people to think about concrete ways of adapting and applying those approaches to Indonesia.
1. Conflict Management Approaches

One of the most important results of the information sharing in Phase I was that it helped to move the dialogue about inter-group conflict in Indonesia from one based on perceived powerlessness to active analysis and action planning. The first, and most important factor in this was the project team’s message that inter-group conflict in Indonesia can be managed in ways that address the underlying causes of that conflict, that specific methodologies have been developed to manage inter-group conflict in other parts of the world, and that those methodologies can be adapted to the diverse political, economic, and cultural contexts in Indonesia.

Although the participants repeatedly expressed concern that methodologies used elsewhere would not succeed in Indonesia without adaptation (a perspective shared by the team members), there was broad agreement with several underlying principles. These included:

- Violent conflict between different ethnic, religious, and other groups is not the inherent result of differences between those groups, but rather the result of unmet human needs (e.g., the needs for security, identity).
- Although power-based approaches can be successful in preventing or stopping violent conflict in the short term, only solutions that address the underlying needs of the conflicting groups will create peace in the long term. (This principle was conveyed by highlighting three basic approaches to conflict management – power-based, rights-based, and interest-based or needs-based approaches – and emphasizing the importance of achieving an appropriate balance among them.)

We emphasized the role of structured dialogue in achieving lasting reconciliation between groups, and provided examples of conflicts in which second-track diplomacy has been used effectively. While there was significant interest in examples from other parts of the world, many people saw the Indonesian situation as unique and resisted attempts at comparison. Over time, we learned to limit the examples to those that resonated most strongly with the participants, such as those from the Middle East, and focused more on potential applications in Indonesia.

Our emphasis on the importance of effective facilitation also led to discussion about who could and should facilitate dialogues in Indonesia, and the development of criteria for selecting facilitators (see Criteria for Selecting Facilitators). The people with whom we met raised important questions about what roles local leaders and “outsiders” (those from the US as well as those from Jakarta) can and should play in local dialogues. The project team has reached a general agreement that facilitation teams should include both local leaders and experienced facilitators, but we have not yet decided what combination of Indonesian and/or US-based facilitators should be involved and what

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6 See Jandt and Pederson, and “People Building Peace” (bibliography in section VII).
roles they should play. Additional insights and conclusions about the facilitation teams are included in the final section.

Although we focused on facilitated dialogue as a means of managing inter-group conflict, we also engaged people in discussing opportunities to use joint action to build constructive relationships between individuals and groups. Through these discussions, we learned about several important joint action initiatives around the country, including inter-faith prayers for peace and joint distribution of rice to needy families. These efforts, as well as others, can serve as important models for collaborative action. However, we have not yet identified people who will take responsibility for collecting and disseminating such examples. In Phase II, we hope to identify someone who will lead this effort.

2. Conflict Management in Indonesia

One of our guiding principles for this project is that all societies have experience with conflict management, and that efforts to build conflict management capacity in Indonesia should be based on an understanding and appreciation of existing or traditional approaches, informal as well as formal. In conflict management theory, this is referred to as the “elicitive” approach to conflict management.\(^7\)

Throughout Phase I, the project team engaged people in discussions about traditional approaches to conflict management. During the smaller, more intensive meetings, such as those we convened during the site visit to West Kalimantan, we were able to explore the subtleties of different approaches around the country, and to raise questions about the strengths and weaknesses of those approaches for dealing with the current inter-group conflicts. Through these discussions, we developed a deeper appreciation of the diversity of approaches to conflict management in Indonesia, including norms and traditions for democratic decision-making and dialogue-based conflict management. Although we tried to weave parallel discussions into the two training workshops, time limits made that difficult. In the workshops planned for Phase II, we plan to leave additional time for in-depth discussions of traditional approaches and the implications of those approaches for capacity building.

One of the important themes that emerged during these discussions was that the “New Order” regime under Suharto significantly undermined traditional approaches to democratic decision-making and conflict management. Instead of drawing on existing norms and mechanisms for conflict management, the government used military, economic, and political power to impose solutions on conflicting parties. For example, the government intervened numerous times, over more than a decade, in the conflict in Sambas. However, their efforts never created lasting peace, because they imposed

\(^7\) See Jean Paul Lederach’s books on the elicitive approach (bibliography in section VII).
solutions on the parties rather than engaging them in developing their own solutions. This is akin to putting temporary bandages on a festering wound.

The New Order regime’s over-use of power-based approaches to conflict management has resulted in lack of awareness of other approaches, including dialogue. For example, when Muslim leaders in West Sumatra became concerned about the distribution of a local-language version of the bible in their community, they went to the military for assistance, rather than speaking with their Christian counterparts about their concerns. Although they participated regularly in an inter-faith forum, it simply did not occur to them that this could be solved through dialogue. This legacy of over-reliance on power-based conflict management, combined with the tendency to avoid conflict and defer to authority in many parts of Indonesia, presents challenges to the project team. However, there are traditional norms and traditions of dialogue that we can build on in future phases.

In discussing traditional approaches to conflict management, we also discovered that several of the words used to convey key conflict management concepts have negative associations in Indonesian. For example, the word “dialogue”, under Suharto, was used to refer to inter-faith discussions designed to create national unity by suppressing awareness of differences. “Musyawarah mufakat” or consensus decision-making based on collective deliberation, while enshrined along with other democratic values in the Pancasila, has come to mean imposing consensus through exploiting the reluctance of group members to express points of view which differ from those of the leaders.

As the meaning of words such as “dialogue” and “consensus” has become clear, we have taken great care to define key terms, and to acknowledge the negative associations of important words. However, there has not yet been enough discussion of what terminology (Indonesian and English) is most appropriate for discussing conflict management in Indonesia. In the workshops in Phase II, we will work with participants to develop an agreed-upon vocabulary for discussing conflict management.

3. Inter-Group Conflicts in Indonesia

The project team spent a significant amount of time in Phase I discussing specific conflicts in Indonesia. During the early meetings, we deliberately began open-ended and served to focus attention on the underlying causes of the inter-group violence in Indonesia. In the face of repeated, rapid explosions of inter-group violence in places like Aceh, Ambon, and Sambas, limited information about the dynamics of those situations, and evidence of the possible involvement of outsiders, many people had concluded that “provocateurs” with ties to the Suharto regime were deliberately provoking violence to undermine the transition to democracy. This led to a sense of powerlessness to stop the violence, illustrated by one participant’s image of the country being coated in gasoline, and provocateur deliberately lighting matches in specific locations.
In response, the project team repeatedly called attention to the fact that provocateurs can only be successful if people and groups let themselves be provoked, and suggested that participants focus on cleaning up the gasoline before it could be ignited. This shift of emphasis from what others were doing or not doing, to what participants could do, contributed to more constructive analysis of underlying causes and potential solutions.

Later in Phase I, the project team convened meetings to learn about conflicts in each of the four areas identified by the Indonesian team members as potential pilot project sites: Aceh, Ambon, Sambas, and Irian Jaya. These meetings yielded important information that the project team used to refine its criteria for site selection (see Section III) and to make initial decisions about site visits. In particular, the project team learned that the Indonesian military (ABRI) has been heavily involved in the conflicts in Aceh and Ambon, and is seen as a key interested party. Given the importance of engaging all parties to a conflict in any dialogue initiative, and the complexities of involving the Indonesian military in such initiatives at this stage, the project team agreed to start with conflicts in which the military is not seen as an interested party.

Having identified Sambas as a possible site for a pilot project, several members of the project team\(^8\) traveled to West Kalimantan for in-depth meetings with religious, ethnic, and community leaders. The team members met with representatives of each of the three ethnic groups involved in recent violence, and explored the history of the conflict, the underlying reasons for the conflict, prior conflict management efforts, and the potential for facilitated dialogue. A detailed site assessment is included later in this report (Section III).

Another team member has also conducted site visits in Irian Jaya, Ambon, and Aceh, although full written reports are not yet available, a preliminary assessment for Ambon is also included in Section III. Additional site visits and assessments are planned for several more localized conflicts in Java and Sumatra during November, with UNDP-EU support (see Section VI). One of the pilot projects will be chosen from this latter group.

4. Action Planning

Throughout Phase I, the project team focused on engaging people in concrete action planning. The results of these efforts were mixed. Many of the professionals and activists involved in various aspects of the project have a strong sense of empowerment, and have readily incorporated conflict management concepts and techniques into their plans for future work. Others, however, have had difficulty envisioning roles they can play in conflict management and have continued to focus on what others (political

\(^8\) The team members who went on the initial site visit to West Kalimantan were Takdir Rahmadi (of the University of Andalas and ICEL), John Davies, and Andrea Strimling.
leaders, religious leaders, etc.) can do to improve the situations. To successfully build conflict management capacity in the long term, the project team must both reach out to people with the capacity to apply conflict management approaches in their organizations and communities, and develop new ways of communicating the concepts that help others develop a sense of empowerment.

**Project Implementation**

During Phase I, the project team learned important lessons about various aspects of project implementation, including project management, training workshops, selecting pilot project sites, selecting facilitators for local dialogues. These lessons, and their implications for future phases, are outlined below.

1. **Project Management**

   To date, the project has been led by a relatively small group of Indonesian and US-based professionals. Although the team succeeded in expanding its experiential diversity in Phase I, it still lacks the institutional and demographic diversity necessary for broad legitimacy. The Indonesian team members have been appropriately reluctant to exert strong leadership in project direction and implementation without a mandate to do so from a legitimate governing or coordinating body. At the same time, both the Indonesian and US-based team members recognize the importance of Indonesian leadership of this project and want to avoid any perceptions of it being US-driven. Together, these concerns have led to some communication and coordination problems, with related inefficiencies.

   To address these problems, the Indonesian team members are in the process of convening a meeting of a wide range of individuals and institutions with interest in inter-group conflict management. The team plans to use this meeting to establish a forum that will provide ongoing, credible leadership for the project and related initiatives, including the formal selection of an organization or individuals to manage the project and promote collaboration and coordination. Although all involved agree on the importance of a representative, legitimate governing body, the team members also recognize the importance of constituting this in a way that does not compromise project manageability by taking up all the time and resources of key people who should be developing applied projects. This will be a priority in Phase II.

2. **Training Facilitators**

   The diversity of cultures in Indonesia, and a mistrust in several areas of Javanese/Jakarta dominance after decades of New Order suppression and central authority, point to the need for:
• locally as well as nationally focused capacity building for constructive conflict management;
• inclusion of representatives from diverse groups in the facilitator-trainer group, and a broad national network of conflict management organizations (NGOs and university centers) willing to coordinate and provide mutual support;
• training/skills building to include understanding of how to address identity needs; promote cross-cultural understanding; and reduce negative stereotypes;
• need for facilitators to be knowledgeable about substantive issues, such as conflicting perspectives on land use and ownership between transmigrants and indigenous (adat) groups.

There was general agreement among the project team that local leaders should be involved in facilitating local dialogues, with the assistance of people with facilitation experience. This reflects significant concern that people from Jakarta would not be trusted by many local communities, given the widespread perception that elites in Jakarta take advantage of the rest of the country. In addition, there was concern that prominent involvement of the US-based team members may tap into existing fears about hidden agendas and call into question the legitimacy of the project (as has happened in relation to UN and Australian-led interventions in East Timor). There was general agreement that local leaders should be involved in facilitating local dialogues, because their involvement will increase the acceptability of the process and contribute to the development of local conflict management capacity. However, there was also recognition that it will be important to also involve experienced facilitators to work with them in the dialogues.

The team has concluded that, given the general distrust of people from Jakarta in other parts of the country, the project team will develop a demographically diverse facilitator pool, with as many people as possible from outside Jakarta and with roots in other parts of the country.

There is frequently mistrust of Westerners as potentially threatening Indonesia’s independence. There have been repeated references to an unfortunate front page media photo of IMF’s Michel Camdessus “standing over” Suharto with arms crossed, as if forcing him to sign the IMF agreement for emergency funding; and to US claims of credit for helping to provoke Suharto’s resignation. This same fear is currently being exacerbated by perceived Australian high-handedness in pushing for peace-keeping troops to enter East Timor. The need is to emphasize building Indonesian capacity for facilitating constructive conflict management themselves, with expatriates maintaining a relatively low-profile supporting (and learning) role, and to emphasize national level capacity building in constructive conflict management as a way to promote national cohesion.

The election of a new president and government which represents a clear break from the New Order regime should improve prospects for resolution particularly of those
conflicts concerning issues of autonomy or separatism. However, given the central government’s complex role as a party to such conflicts, and its perceived lack of impartiality, there is a need to focus on strengthening the capacity and engagement of civil society institutions in conflict management processes.

Two sectors of society that appear to have broad respect as opinion leaders and who thus should be drawn on in this capacity building process are university faculty with relevant training, and former ministers, ambassadors or other former senior officials who have relevant experience or substantive expertise in the conflict issues. This has led us to emphasize working not only with NGOs, but also to encourage the development of, and cooperative networking with, university centers such as that planned for UI. Among NGOs, those led by high profile opinion leaders are particularly valuable in mobilizing support, but at the same time there is a need to ensure they can model genuine dialogue and integrative decision-making rather than imposing a consensus without real buy-in or lasting support. The same issue will continue to arise in identifying and working with community leaders to engage in constructive dialogue.

3. Selecting Pilot Project Sites

Substantial investment of time is needed to adequately assess potential intervention sites and potential facilitators and participants. For this reason it is a good idea to engage university-based academics (social scientists) in “conflict mapping” and risk assessment research, and to allow time for site visits and personal meetings with potential participants. It is important to get feedback from several sources before deciding on whom we should work with as local facilitators and representatives of the different groups: for example, Kenny Kumala is highly regarded locally in Singkawang as an acceptable facilitator, but is seen as now “too political” by many in Pontianak, following his election to parliament as a member of PDI-P.

4. Conducting Workshops

A clear emphasis needs to be on training exercises rather than just discussion of concepts—“show-how” rather than just “know-how.” Emphasis should also be on mentoring trainee facilitators in real-life conflict management workshops so that they will feel ready to take the lead themselves. There are many Indonesians who now have some training in constructive conflict management, but extremely few who are applying it, at least to inter-group conflicts.

Also in workshops, we have found that there is a need to focus on bringing participants not just to agree on what needs to be done, but also on who is committed to do what when and where. The habit after decades of authoritarian government has been to assume that it is up to authorities to act, and for others to wait and follow their decisions, rather than taking initiative to act as a responsible member of the community.
In this way, training in conflict management skills becomes a tool for empowering civil society and strengthening norms of democratic participation.

5. Interpretation

Workshops and seminar discussions are far more effective when we have highly skilled translators knowledgeable about basic concepts of conflict management, and who can provide translation in both directions. Much is lost if only English can be used, or if the translator is unfamiliar with the concepts or can only summarize. We need to identify more people who can play this role (as Takdir Rahmadi did in West Kalimantan, while also participating substantively in the discussions in his own right).

6. Continuity

We have found that it can be a challenge to maintain close collaboration via email or phone from out of the country, particularly if there is too much reliance on email alone. It works better to maintain frequent personal contact, and to make use of opportunities to visit.

III. SITE EVALUATION

This section contains a list of proposed criteria for pilot project site selection, a preliminary list of sites considered early in Phase I, a draft agenda for use in the informational meetings in Jakarta with experts in each of the conflict areas, and an in-depth site evaluation of Sambas, West Kalimantan by the US-based and Indonesian partners involved in that visit. Although one of the Indonesian partners has also conducted site visits in Irian Jaya, Aceh, and Ambon, so far only a preliminary evaluation for Ambon has been written. Evaluations of more local sites in Java and Sumatra by Indonesian partners are also expected in November.

PROPOSED CRITERIA FOR SITE SELECTION

Note: A full site evaluation will include an analysis of the structural and dynamic factors driving the conflict, as well as a mapping of the parties and other stakeholders in the conflict, and recent management efforts. The criteria below emphasize issues relevant to suitability for selection specifically as a pilot project within the current overall project.
Motivation and Commitment

- Significant local and/or national concern about inter-group tensions and/or potential future violence.
- Local officials, informal leaders, and/or prospective partners (facilitators and participants) request assistance.
- Local facilitators committed to project and long term follow-up.
- Local participants committed to project goals and process.
- Project leadership team (in-country and expatriate) motivated and committed to see the process through to the point at which it is reasonable to ask the local participants to take over responsibility (subject to evidence of positive progress).
- Funding institutions motivated and committed to see the process through to the point at which it is feasible for others to take over responsibility (subject to evidence of positive progress).

Feasibility

- Parties to the conflict can be identified.
- Local participants who have legitimacy to represent their communities informally in this process can be convened.
- Local participants are opinion leaders (i.e., have the networks and skills to communicate insights from the process at leadership and/or grassroots levels).
- Facilitator team (local, national and expatriate) can gain the acceptance of the participants.
- Facilitators and participants can be brought together in a safe environment for workshops and can maintain communications between workshops.
- Likelihood of disruption by any potential spoilers can be minimized through confidentiality, strategic communication, or inclusion.

Leveragability

- Conflict involves some issues that are also of concern elsewhere in the country and/or region.
- Success in this project can inspire other peace-building activities in the country and/or region.
- Lessons learned about process in this location can be perceived as applicable to other conflict situations in the country and/or region.
- Some of the local and/or national facilitators will be available to apply the skills and insights they develop in this project to future projects.

PRELIMINARY LIST OF POTENTIAL PILOT PROJECT SITES

List of Major Conflict Sites Considered (Developed by Indonesian Team Members)
Sambas/West Kalimantan
Aceh
Ambon
Irian Jaya

Additional “Minor” Conflict Sites Being Considered (Developed by Indonesian Team)

- Tanggerang, W. Java (ethnic conflict)
- Ketapang, Jakarta (religious and ethnic conflict)
- Riau, Sumatra (religious conflict; expatriate and central/local government issues)
- Palembang, S. Sumatra (ethnic and religious conflict; transmigrant issues)
- Kupang, E. Nusa Tenggara (refugee issues—impact of East Timor conflict)
- Horseshoe region, NE Java (refugee issues—impact of Sambas conflict)

SITE ASSESSMENT: SAMBAS, WEST KALIMANTAN

This report is based on meetings with several people during a July visit to West Kalimantan (Pontianak and Singkawang) by Takdir Rahmadi, John Davies and Andrea Strimling, including (in order of meeting):

1. T. Arsen Rickson, MP for Pontianak (met in Jakarta)
2. Norberta Yati, Flaurus and others at Pancur Kasi Foundation in Pontianak
3. Piet Herman Abik and Tadeus Yus of Dayak Customary Council in Pontianak
4. Dr. Bambang Garang (Dean of Education) and Tadeus Yus (Lecturer of Law) of Tanjung Pura University in Pontianak
5. Kenny Kumala, Director of the Diakoni Foundation and new MP for Singkawang
6. Residents of the refugee camp for Madurese near Singkawang
7. M. Jamras, chair of the FKPM (Melayu Communication Forum) with Hasari, Ikhdar, Hamdi and other members of FKPM (including youth leaders)
8. Libertus Ahi (vice-chair?) and other Dayak representatives of the Adat Council in Singkawang
9. Hambali, Madurese head of the Ulamas’ Association in Sambas, with the chairman of the youth organization of Nahadlatul Ulama, and secretary and other members of the Communication Forum of Madurese Community (Fokus Kamra) in Sambas
10. Nuruddin A. Rachman, General Secretary of BASSRA (Fraternity of Madurese Moslem Leaders Association) (met in Washington DC in October)
Background and Roots of the Conflict

Violent conflict between Dayak (indigenous) and Madurese (transmigrants from Madura and their descendants) communities in the Sambas region of West Kalimantan has flared up on at least nine occasions since 1967. Both are minority communities, and in the past, provincial authorities have been able to bring the parties to an agreement to stop the fighting, most recently in 1997. However, the violence in 1999, which is reported to have killed 338 people and burned 3,152 houses (209 of them fully destroyed), for the first time also involved the Melayu (Malay), the biggest ethnic group in the region, fighting with the Dayaks against the Madurese. The Madurese sustained most casualties (324 killed, 3,123 houses burned, 207 destroyed) and were largely driven from the region, many being shipped to Madura and Java (although many had never been there) and many others being held in refugee camps in Pontianak and Singkawang. No official dialogue has been held, and no agreement has yet been reached on how to resolve the issues which underlay or were caused by the violence.

Issues identified as being at the root of the conflict by those interviewed include:

1. **Structural economic** factors: West Kalimantan is resource rich and an important contributor to national income, but its people are the poorest and have less education than those in other parts of Indonesia. The level of funding returned to the province from the national government is seen as disproportionately low.

2. **Structural political** factors: The highly centralized (top-down) system of governance in Indonesia means that local government representatives have few effective links with the informal (adat) leaders or the people. Denied access to funds distributed by the central government, traditional adat leaders have become marginalized.

3. **Structural cultural** factors: The central government’s efforts during the New Order regime have been to create a uniform national culture. However, despite the imposition in 1979 of the Kapala Desa model of local government (seen as Javanese), most people still recognize the local adat (Tumenggung) leaders as more legitimate, with Desa members seen primarily as representing the central government. In addition, official ideology encourages people to sacrifice land and traditions in the name of economic development, undercutting traditional social structures and beliefs particularly of the Dayaks. The Madurese transmigrants benefiting or taking advantage of such development policies, and resisting the claimed moral authority of the Tumenggung, reap the resentment particularly of the Dayaks.

4. **Structural social** factors: There appears to be a lack of political will to enforce laws. The police and army do little to discourage crime, particularly timber
stealing, use of force to take over specific markets or sectors of the economy, and illegal gambling (attributed mainly to Madurese). This vacuum leads to a sense of injustice among disadvantaged groups.

5. **Non-structural cultural** factors: Madurese traditionally carry knives on their belts (though those Madurese who have been longer in the region generally do not), and this is regarded as highly objectionable and threatening by Dayaks and Melayu. The Madurese are also seen by the other groups as aggressive and often unfair or even illegal in their business dealings and other interactions, and the weapons issue thus serves as a symbolic focus for mistrust and resentment of Madurese. Religious differences are not regarded as important, though Madurese are mainly Muslim, Dayaks mainly Christian, because the (Muslim) Melayu allied with the Dayaks against the Madurese in the latest fighting. However, there is little social communication across cultural lines which are quite distinct.

6. **Non-structural economic** factors: Madurese have accumulated a relatively large share of the available land and economic assets, and are seen by others as having stolen much of it. Dayaks regard the land as belonging to their people, and their traditions and customs as the legitimate basis for caring for the land and setting norms for social interactions. Madurese regard the land as “belonging to God” and therefore equally open for acquisition by them (as allowed under the laws of the central government).

7. **Displacement due to the fighting**: The Sambas countryside, except for Singkawang and the refugee camps in Singkawang and Pontianak, has been virtually emptied of Madurese, whose houses have been burned and/or taken over by others along with their land. There is strong resistance to their return, but no clear alternatives for the Madurese: most of those shipped to Madura or nearby parts of Java have no roots or prospects there and are contributing to instability in those areas. With the large numbers of displaced people in and out of refugee camps, the problem is not going to go away in the absence of an agreed strategy for addressing these issues.

8. **Distrust following collapse of earlier peace agreements**: There have been dialogues between Madurese and Dayaks after earlier episodes of violence, with mediation from regional government representatives, culminating in peace agreements. Dayaks see these as being repeatedly broken by Madurese, and feel they cannot be trusted again. Melayu involvement in this conflict also undercuts the perceived impartiality of any potential official mediation effort.

Gurr⁹ identifies for main risk factors for ethnic conflict, all of which are present in this case:

⁹ See Davies and Gurr, 1998, Chapter 1 (bibliography in Section VII)
• Group incentives for collective action—both Madurese and Dayaks experience cultural, and to some extent economic and/or political, discrimination;
• Group capacity for sustained collective action—group identity and cohesion is strong in each case, allowing ready mobilization;
• Group opportunities for collective action—the recent change in regime from highly autocratic to transitional democratic, and the broad support that each group can draw from kin outside the district and province provides more openings for violence now than in past years, for Melayu at least as much as the other groups; and
• Conditions shaping regime response—a history of elite (central government and army) reliance on coercion, lack of democratic experience, and limited available resources for investment limit the likelihood of constructive intervention to address grievances.

Motivation and Commitment

1. There is significant local and national concern about inter-group tensions and potential future violence in Sambas. In particular, some expressed concern over rumors that Madurese are planning to take their land back by force, and that Dayaks and Malays are preparing to fight them off. Informal local leaders and intellectuals of three ethnic groups, Madura, Malay and Dayak, together are motivated and committed to find ways to resolve the conflict involving the three groups and to prevent violence from recurring in the future. They agree that recurring ethnic violence in their province and districts is intolerable.

2. Several local officials, informal leaders and prospective partners have requested assistance, or indicated that it is needed. For example, Hambali, one of the informal leaders of Madura people in Pontianak and a prominent Moslem scholar (ulama), and exponents of the Madura youth organization, "Fokus Kamra" in Singkawang, welcomed the idea of holding dialogues between representatives of the three ethnic groups, since dialogues facilitated by the provincial government and police no longer take place. Dayak informal leaders and intellectuals who live in Pontianak such as Flaurus, of Pancur Kasih Foundation, Bambang TK Garang and Tadeus Yus of Tanjung Pura University and Piet Herman Abik, a teacher, supported the idea of dialogues, although they personally may not be able to participate. Representatives of the Dayak adat council and the Malay Communication Forum (FKPS) in Singkawang were also supportive of dialogues. A Madurese refugee who acted as a guide in our visit to the camp in Singkawang also expressed the need for reconciliation among the conflicting ethnic groups.

3. Local facilitators and dialogue participants from each of the three groups are still to be selected. Hambali mentioned some potential facilitators and participants on
behalf of Madura community. They are Abdul Syukur, Ridai, Chairuman Arrahbini, Madar Hadrawi who live in Pontianak, Tarab who lives in Sambas, and Muhajir who lives in Sanggau. He also mentioned Syarif Alkadri and Chairil Effendi, both university professors who would be accepted as facilitators for the Malay people. The informal Dayak leaders in Pontianak mentioned Libertus Ahi as a Dayak man, who lives in Singkawang, is as an appropriate man to be involved in dialogues. Libertus also was present at the meeting in Singkawang hosted by Kenny Kumala. Other Dayak representatives at the same meeting suggested that Dayak adat leaders should be representatives of Dayak communities.

Leaders of the Communication Forum of Malay Youth in Sambas attending the meeting hosted by Kenny Kumala, including M. Jamras, Ikhdar and Hamdi, are strong potential participants since they agreed to participate in dialogues. They also mentioned “Sinar”, an NGO which has facilitated some dialogues between Malay and Dayak following the conflicts in early 1999, as potential local facilitator of our proposed dialogues.

Additional candidates mentioned are, for the Melayu, Ismet Nur, Dean of Tanjung Pura University, and Taheri Noor in Jakarta; and for the Madurese, H. Sulaiman of Ikamra in Pontianak, and Abdullah Schal, Imam Buchori and Fuad Amin (key Ulamas in Madura—Buchori’s wife is from West Kalimantan). Tadeus Yus (see above) has indicated strong interest in receiving training as a potential facilitator for the project, but more interviewing and follow-up discussion is needed to identify suitable and balanced teams. Piet Herman Abik’s NGO is already involved in providing training in conflict resolution within the Dayak Temunggun network adapted to local traditions and environments.

4. The project leadership team is motivated to develop a facilitated dialogue for this conflict. More work is needed during our next visit and facilitator training sessions to clarify responsibilities both for project team members and potential local participants and facilitators before making a firm commitment to go ahead with this site as a pilot project.

5. Further assessment is needed of the time and level of effort likely to be required for this process, and hence of the need for further commitment from funding institutions beyond what can be provided within the current OTI funded project.

Feasibility

1. The parties to the conflict can be identified. These are the Dayak, Madurese and Melayu communities in the Sambas region, making up about 30%, 7% and 40% of the population respectively. Although Madurese have been ejected from the
countryside, they can be represented by those (individuals and organizations) in the cities (Singkawang, Pontianak and Sanggau) and the refugee camps. While the three groups are clearly distinct from each other, it should be remembered that internally each community is very diverse, and each has important links with larger communities elsewhere in West Kalimantan and in other parts of Indonesia. There are said to be 350 different Dayak ethnic groups, each with its own (as well as overlapping) traditions and concerns. Madurese include many who have lived in Sambas for generations, often inter-marrying with other groups, and no longer have roots in or speak the language of Madura, as well as recent transmigrants who have little knowledge of local traditions, and follow their own traditions for self-protection against perceived threats from the local population. Both groups look for leadership in part to prominent figures outside Sambas, such as Dayak leaders in Pontianak and Madurese Ulamas in Madura. Other distinct groups in the region are Javanese (20%) ethnic Chinese, and Buginese (both less than 5%).

2. Local participants with legitimacy to represent their communities in this process and to act as opinion leaders can be convened. There are existing social and adat organizations within each community with leaders and activist members who have legitimacy as opinion leaders and representatives. They have legitimate standing as representatives or spokesmen of their people at the grassroots level. Organizations that represent Madurese interests and cultural identity are "Ikatan Keluarga Madura" (IKMARA, the Association of Madurese Families), and "Forum Komunikasi Keluarga Madura (Fokus Kamra, or the Communication Forum of MadureseYouth)."

In addition to activists of these organizations, a Madurese ulama may have legitimacy as a participant, since an ulama is a charismatic man for the Madurese, and what he says is often listened to by the people. Thus, the combination of activists of the two organizations and ulamas could be opinion leaders able to communicate process and results of proposed dialogues to Madurese at the grassroots level. Dayak communities have adat organizations on provincial, district, sub-district and village levels. These four levels of adat organizations should have their representations in proposed dialogues, as adat leaders at all levels are seen as legitimate representatives of the Dayak people, and could communicate process and results effectively to people at the grassroots level. The most appropriate equivalent organization for the Malay appears to be the Malay Communication Forum, through which young Malay activists have legitimacy as leaders in their community able to participate in the dialogues and communicate back with their communities.

3. Facilitator team (local, national and expatriate) can gain acceptance of the participants. All three discussion groups we met with indicated strong interest in moving forward in partnership with a combination of the project team facilitators
(both national and expatriate team members were represented) and local facilitators representing each of the three communities and acceptable across community lines. More consultation will be needed to specify and reach agreement on exactly who should be involved at each level, so that where possible local facilitators can be offered additional skills training before the start of actual dialogue if needed. The potential local facilitators mentioned by our informants are still subject to further interview. In our first-two day field visit, we did not have a chance to meet and interview potential local facilitators as such, except for Kenny Kumala, who to some extent has actually acted as a local facilitator in convening internal dialogue groups. He is regarded as being impartial and acceptable by all three groups in Singkawang, but since he has been elected for the member of the National House of Representatives, he may not have the time to fully participate in our proposed dialogues, and may be seen as politically partisan by those at the provincial level.

4. Facilitators and participants can be brought together in a safe environment for workshops and maintaining communications. Singkawang and Pontianak both offer safe environments where dialogues could be held. The Malay activists proposed Singkawang because it is a declared peace zone. Pontianak can also be considered a safe environment since it is relatively remote from conflict zones. Pontianak may be the better location both because it is more removed from the conflict zones, and because it will facilitate involvement by representatives and/or facilitators at the provincial level as well.

We were able to meet at short notice in Singkawang with existing discussion groups including leaders from each of the three communities, and all three indicated readiness to engage in facilitated dialogue with the others (we were able to meet with the Melayu and Dayak groups together, but neither has yet met with the Madurese). All three included able spokesmen with the necessary skills and standing to convey new perspectives to all levels of their communities.

5. Likelihood of disruption by potential spoilers can be minimized through confidentiality, strategic communication and/or inclusion. The only reservations we have encountered so far were not focused on the proposed dialogue itself, but on optimal participants and facilitators, and timing. There is a concern among some Dayaks and Melayu that it may be too early to reach any agreement or accommodation with the Madurese that may allow their even partial or conditional return, because more time is needed for healing, and because there are complex issues over land ownership to resolve. However, if it is recognized that the early stages of the dialogue itself may be a means to promote healing on both sides and reduce the risk of further violence even prior to agreement, this should not be a critical factor. Strategic communication and engagement will be a
priority in the process of achieving consensus on who should be the participants and facilitators.

Leveragability

1. **The conflict involves issues that are also of concern elsewhere in the country**, so that success in this project can inspire other peace-building activities. These issues include indigenous versus non-indigenous rights to live in and to engage in commercial activities in the province, unevenly-distributed benefits of economic development, unequal job opportunities, cultural identity, decentralization versus centralization of public administration, and weak law enforcement. All eight factors listed at the beginning of this site report apply directly (structural factors) or have close analogues in other conflict areas within Indonesia, including Ambon, Aceh and Irian Jaya.

2. **Lessons learned about the process in this location can be perceived as applicable to other conflict locations** in the country. Although there will necessarily be some unique aspects in the way in which the process is adapted to build on the strengths offered by local traditional practices that may be acceptable across the different communities, this adaptability of the process in itself should support the perception of its broad applicability. Examples of such local traditional practices (particularly among Dayaks) include customary meetings between the conflicting parties, with the support of a respected mediator or mediating group, and a ceremony following agreement to symbolize that balance has been restored and that no more violence is needed.

3. **Some of the facilitators will be available to apply their new skills and insights to future projects.** The concept behind a national level project and the involvement of national level facilitators is precisely to ensure this result. We also expect based on our discussions so far that some of the local facilitators would be interested and available to apply their experience elsewhere.

Conclusions

In sum, it would seem that this is a very promising site for a pilot project. If it is agreed, based on a review and comparison of completed site assessments, that it should be one of two top priority sites, our next task during phase II will be to interview and select participants and local facilitators from those available and recommended or broadly acceptable for each ethnic group. We would suggest that each ethnic group be represented by three participants or community representatives. For the Madurese, the three participants for each ethnic group should reflect leadership at three different levels: province, district and village level. The village level should be represented by a person living at one of the refugee camps in Singkawang or in Pontianak. Local facilitators should reflect a balance of ethnic groups involved in the dialogues, unless there are one
or two local facilitators who are seen as impartial (such as Kenny Kumala who is part ethnic Chinese, part German). This means there may need to be three local facilitators to ensure fairness will not be an issue.

If this site is selected, during phase II we will need to hold preliminary meetings separately with local participants and facilitators for each group to agree on an acceptable process for the dialogues which as far as possible builds on traditions respected by all parties, drawing as needed from the facilitators’ experience in other locations in order to compensate for any acknowledged limitations in available traditional practice. The dialogues are normally conducted in a series of workshops of at least three days each, spaced according to the needs of the participants and facilitators, but this pattern may be changed to accommodate local preferences.

A pattern that tends to hold true across cultures is that a dialogue moves through phases of orientation, reviewing the experiences and perceptions each party has of the conflict, locating the roots or core concerns driving the conflict, seeking paths toward resolution and reconciliation, agreeing on specific steps or actions for peace-building, including long term review and follow up. What those paths or steps may be we will not try to define in advance, as it is essential that they emerge through constructive engagement among the parties to the dialogue, in order that agreements reached are fully owned by the parties, and not seen as imposed.

**PRELIMINARY SITE ASSESSMENT: AMBON/MALUKU**

Even as this report was being written (early November 1999), some violent conflicts were still occurring in both the northern and southern part of the Mollucas (Maluku province). In the meantime, however, the situation in Ambon City has improved, even though sometimes some small-scale incidents still take place in several parts of the city. The university has returned to their normal daily activities. Air transportation from Ambon to Jakarta operates once a day, with long lines of passengers queuing for a ticket. However the latest information is that Mandala Airlines (the other airline company) will also begin to operate their aircraft again in a short time.

**Motivation and Commitment**

Motivation to live in a peaceful situation has increased for the people in Ambon. However, there are different perspectives cultivated between two groups in terms of the appropriate strategy for a reconciliation process. One group believes that they should find the truth, the core of the problem, and the people who should take responsibility for causing the conflict

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10 Information based in part on consultation with Prof. Ronny Titahetu, Dean of Law Pattimura University. Prof. Astrid Susanto-Sunario’s July 1999 report “Tragedy and Massacre of Citizens in Some Villages and Homesteads on the Island of Ambon” (37pp.) presented to the Project Team in Jakarta, also may be treated as an historical background appendix to this assessment.
and emergence of the riots in Ambon. These people must be detected and given severe punishment. The other group believes that people don’t have to look back, as this would only cause more pain. Rather, they should forgive, forget, and find a way to live together in harmony like in the past.

A point of view that might satisfy both groups of people in Ambon is that attention should be given to developing a truth and reconciliation process, wherein both perspectives can be combined. Forgetting the problem is not a solution. It might occur again in the future if we cannot find and resolve the core of the problem. However, in a complex situation like Ambon (involving a lot of people in the violence) it is also important to forgive and look forward.

Some activities in Ambon have shown the people’s commitment to solve their conflict. An example showing the willingness of the Christian group to make peace with the Moslem group is when they returned a “becak” (traditional cart) belonging to the Moslem group as requested.

Dialogues between Moslem and Christian intellectuals at the university level have been conducted several times. There have been dialogues between Christian and Moslem professors, between professors and students, and between the students of the two communities themselves, which led to a mutual understanding among them that Moslems and Christians both believe they should not fight each other. They realize that as colleagues they have to work side by side, putting aside the differences between them for the benefit their future. They also agreed not to look back to find who started the conflict, but rather to focus their attention on how to solve the problem/conflict.

The reconciliation dialogue has progressed now to where the discussion not only takes place within elite political circles like before, but now also in the civil society level. However, the dialogue still has to be held in a place considered to be a neutral location, such as Universities, because it still takes time to heal the trauma.

For the time being, the work places for Moslem people and Christian people still have to be separate, even though they work in the same institution. If they have to communicate with each other, they have to go to a neutral place to talk, or use a telephone.

Initiating dialogue between people at the grassroots level is still problematic. They are emotionally still covered with deep hate and distrust.

**Feasibility**

Identification of Parties in conflict, specific issues and their interest could not be completed yet. Therefore we could not come to a conclusion on how the Mollucas case might be resolved. If we look into the progress that people in Ambon have done so far, such as initiating the dialogue between Moslem and Christian, at least we can see there is a strong

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11 Christian in this context means both Protestant and Catholic.
desire of the Ambon people to resolve the conflict. *Kelompok Perempuan Peduli* (Women’s NGO) with support from UNDP also facilitated some dialogue between women (Moslem and Christian) and disseminated the outcomes to their family and relatives and also people in the neighborhood. *Tim Kajian Karusuhun* of Pattimura University has conducted some research and discussions related to conflict resolution in the Mollucas, which should add valuable sources of information to the very limited amount that is now available.

One problem which has not been focused on yet is law enforcement. People hope that given what had happened in the past—such as discrimination before the law between the local people and transmigrants—that suspending law enforcement might at least guarantee that that will not happen again.

Factors motivating the parties in Ambon to possibly engage in dialogues:
1. The people have realized that violence could not give benefit to anybody;
2. Strong willingness from the students to continue their studies and awareness that riots and violence will not support their interest.
3. Sincerity from each of the parties to see the past condition as a part of the past and willingness to start a new life for the future.
Leveragability

The conflict in Ambon is not similar to other regional conflicts. But if even the people in Ambon could resolve their conflict through a truth and reconciliation process, hopefully other regions, with conflicts in some ways similar in type to Ambon’s (religious and ethnic discrimination, violated human rights and social injustice) will consider having the same approaches.

IV. WORKSHOPS

The project team conducted orientation and training workshops on July 22 and July 31. This section contains all written materials developed before, during, and after the workshops, including draft agendas, participant lists, transcribed flip charts, and handouts. The minutes and flip charts were typed in Bahasa Indonesian and translated into English for this report.

FOUR BASIC APPROACHES TO ASSISTING PARTIES IN CONFLICT

1.** IMPROVED NEGOTIATIONS**

Coaching, training or advice to negotiators, to make the negotiation process more effective, and/or addition of a neutral third party (mediator/facilitators) to provide process assistance.

2. **FACILITATED PARALLEL NEGOTIATIONS**

Organizing discussions of issues among people who are in a position to explore more options, usually with the assistance of a neutral third party (facilitator or mediator).

3. **RELATIONSHIP BUILDING**

Efforts to build trust, improve communication, increase understanding, and/or develop and implement common goals among the parties to a conflict.
4. DEVELOPMENT OF SYSTEMS

Creation and implementation of new or improved mechanisms, institutions, or procedures for communication, peacekeeping, or conflict resolution.

Note: There are many variations and sub-types within each of these basic approaches.

V. PROSPECTIVE FACILITATORS

This section contains criteria for selecting facilitators, developed by participants during Workshop 2, as well as a recommended list of people to invite to the facilitation training in Phase II, based on those criteria.

PROPOSED CRITERIA FOR SELECTING FACILITATORS

(Developed by participants during Workshop 2; to be refined by project team)

1. Able to listen
2. Accommodative
3. Neutral/uninvolved
4. Available/mobile
5. Acceptable to both parties
6. Knowledgeable on conflict dynamics
7. Sensitivity to local cultures/norms
8. Process skills
9. Communication skills
10. Commitment to the process
11. Patience, integrity, respect

VI. PROJECT TEAM AND PREPARATORY COMMITTEE PLANNING MEETINGS AND PROGRESS REPORTS
The project team met numerous times during Phase I to develop plans for project implementation. Summary minutes were taken for two of several “Preparatory Committee” meetings following the workshops, and they are included in this section. Note that the minutes were taken in Bahasa Indonesian and translated into English for this report. A summary report by the Committee on progress toward establishing an NGO or Forum on inter-group conflict management is also included, along with a proposal to UNDP-EU to support a November Forum meeting and additional site evaluations.

PROGRESS REPORT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NETWORK OR NGO ON INTER-GROUP CONFLICT RESOLUTION

As a result of a workshop on July 22, 1999 in Jakarta which was convened by the project’s Preparatory Committee (“PrepCom”) (Emil Salim and IRIS), 5 recommendations were made:

1. To establish a national steering committee which consists of representatives of groups and experts, to develop a clear guidelines on how to resolve escalating inter-group conflicts (ethnic, religious, etc.) which are being experienced in many places in Indonesia;
2. To form a competent (national) cadre of trainer-facilitators (15-25) to train and prepare local conflict facilitators which will be actively working with conflicting parties in the field;
3. To identify the potential area(s) to be assessed as pilot cases of interest based conflict resolution which have a sufficient level of mediability and leveragability;
4. To conduct conflict site assessments (also called social mapping) in selected locations; and
5. To establish a well managed and professional Project Management Organization (PMO) which will be running and coordinating all the activities above.

MANUAL OUTLINE AND RESOURCE LISTS

This section includes a draft outline for a conflict management manual, examples of resources to be used in assembling the manual, a select bibliography on relevant topics,
DRAFT OUTLINE: MANUAL

INTRODUCTION

- **Purpose**
  - Need in Indonesia, opportunity for diversity and change as resources for development
  - Enhance capacity in both theory and practice relevant to people with different levels of experience and areas of specialization
  - Resolution and prevention of violent inter-group conflict
  - Sustainable peace, developing democracy
  - Usefulness: sustainable development, enhanced quality of life
- **Principles/assumptions**
  - Appropriateness to cultural context
  - Build on existing capacity, traditional approaches (elicitive approach)
  - Work in progress (ongoing adaptation based on feedback, input)
  - Sustainable peace and development based on capacity for constructive conflict management
- **Overview of contents**
  - Part I
  - Part II
  - Part III
- **Project Overview & Acknowledgments**
  - Background - how project developed, description
  - Who’s contributed to the manual

PART 1: THE MANAGEMENT OF COMPLEX INTER-GROUP CONFLICTS

- **Brief Introduction to Part I (purpose, structure)**
- **Complex inter-group conflict**
  - Definition
  - Examples from around the world—commonalities and differences
  - How different from other kinds of conflict
  - Roots of complex inter-group conflict (underlying factors vs. triggers)
  - Identity issues, human needs
  - Dynamics of mobilization and stalemate
• Impact of violence vs. non-violent engagement

• Management of Complex Inter-Group Conflict
  • Terminology - peace building, reconciliation, conflict resolution, conflict transformation, conflict management, conflict settlement
  • Framework: Power, rights, interests & needs
  • Existing approaches in Indonesia: strengths and limitations
  • Second track and multi-track diplomacy
  • Peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace building
  • Preventive diplomacy and reconciliation
  • Third party involvement: facilitated dialogue/ joint action planning
  • Other types of conflict management and peace-building activities
  • Current initiatives in Indonesia and the region

PART II: FACILITATING INTER-GROUP DIALOGUES

• Inter-group dialogues
  • What are they?
  • Why and when they may be helpful
  • Examples of where they have been used
  • Elements of “success”

• Third Party Involvement
  • Value and roles of third parties in inter-group dialogues –
  • Types of third party: facilitators, mediators, arbitrators etc.
  • Who generally plays this role? criteria for third-party selection, individuals vs. teams, etc.)
  • When to get involved?
  • How to get involved? Steps:
    • Conflict assessment and mapping
    • Identifying participants (potential representatives and local facilitators)
    • Convening and jointly defining the process
    • Facilitating stages of the dialogue
    • Long-term follow-up and ongoing evaluation

• Skill building
  • Criteria for selecting facilitators, assembling facilitation team
  • Key skills: e.g., listening, analytical empathy, brainstorming, problem solving
  • Exercises in communication and facilitation
  • Specific techniques: e.g. deconstructing enemy image, mapping preferred futures, identifying interests and needs, finding common ground, action planning.