

**Dataset: ICB2**

**Codebook for ICB2 - International Crisis Behavior Project**

**Actor-Level Dataset – January 2009**

**ICPSR Study #9286 – Version 9.0**

**Principal Investigators: Jonathan Wilkenfeld and Michael Brecher**

This dataset (ICB2) comprises the actor-level data of the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project. The data span the period 1918-2006, with data on 994 crisis actors. For an extensive discussion of the structure of the actor-level data, see Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, A Study of Crisis, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2000. See also ICBOnline at <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb> .

**Control Variables**

**Control Variable: 1**

**Name: ICB2**

**INTERNATIONAL CRISIS BEHAVIOR PROJECT - ACTOR LEVEL DATASET**

**Control Variable: 2**

**Name: CRISNO**

**INTERNATIONAL CRISIS NUMBER**

**Control Variable: 3**

**Name: CRACNO**

**SEQUENTIAL CASE NUMBER**

**Control Variable: 4**

**Name: CRACID**

STANDARD NUMERICAL COUNTRY ID

(See Table 1)

**Control Variable: 5**

**Name: ACTOR**

THREE LETTER COUNTRY ID

(See Table 1)

Data were collected on two case descriptors and 80 variables for each actor case. The two case descriptors are the following:

**Descriptive Variable: 1**

**Name: SYSDATE (SYSTRGYR, SYSTRGMO, SYSTRGDA)**

YEAR, MONTH, DAY OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS TRIGGER

**Descriptive Variable: 2**

**Name: CRISNAME (CLUSTER1, CLUSTER2, CLUSTER3, CLUSTER4, CLUSTER5, CLUSTER6)**

NAME OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS

## ICB List of States in the International System, 1918-2003

The three-letter actor codes and the three-digit identification numbers for states in the system correspond to those presented by Gleditsch and Ward, and are almost identical to the codes in the Correlates of War Project. See Kristian S. Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward (1999). "Interstate System Membership: A Revised List of the Independent States since 1816," *International Interactions* 25: 393-413.

NAME	CODE NAME (ACTOR)	NUMBER (CRACID)
Afghanistan	AFG	700
Albania	ALB	339
Algeria	ALG	615
Andorra	AND	232
Angola	ANG	540
Antigua & Barbuda	AAB	058
Argentina	ARG	160
Armenia	ARM	371
Australia	AUL	900
Austria	AUS	305
Azerbaijan	AZE	373
Bahamas	BHM	031
Bahrain	BAH	692
Bangladesh	BNG	771
Barbados	BAR	053
Belarus	BLR	370
Belgium	BEL	211
Belize	BLZ	080
Benin (Dahomey)	BEN	434
Bhutan	BHU	760
Bolivia	BOL	145
Bosnia	BOS	346
Botswana	BOT	571
Brazil	BRA	140
Brunei	BRU	835
Bulgaria	BUL	355
Burkina Faso (Upper Volta)	BFO	439
Burma (see Myanmar)		
Burundi	BUI	516
Cambodia	CAM	811
Cameroon	CAO	471
Canada	CAN	020
Cape Verde	CAP	402
Central African Republic	CEN	482
Chad	CHA	483
Chile	CHL	155
China	CHN	710
China-Taiwan-Formosa		

<b>NAME</b>	<b>CODE NAME (ACTOR)</b>	<b>NUMBER (CRACID)</b>
(see Taiwan)		
Colombia	COL	100
Comoros	COM	581
Congo Brazzaville	CON	484
<b>Congo, Democratic Republic of (Congo Kinshasa) (Zaire)</b>	<b>DRC</b>	<b>490</b>
Costa Rica	COS	094
Cote D'Ivoire	CDI	437
Croatia	CRO	344
Cuba	CUB	040
Cyprus	CYP	352
Czech Republic	CZR	316
Czechoslovakia	CZE	315
Dahomey (see Benin)		
Denmark	DEN	390
Djibouti (Somalia Fr.)	DJI	522
Dominica	DMA	054
Dominican Republic	DOM	042
Ecuador	ECU	130
Egypt (UAR)	EGY	651
El Salvador	SAL	092
Equatorial Guinea	EQG	411
Eritrea	ERI	531
Estonia	EST	366
Ethiopia	ETH	530
<b>Federated States of Micronesia</b>	<b>FSM</b>	<b>987</b>
Fiji	FIJ	950
Finland	FIN	375
France	FRN	220
Vichy France	VFR	219
French West Africa	FWA	480
Gabon	GAB	481
Gambia	GAM	420
Georgia	GRG	372
Germany (Prussia)	GMY	255
<b>German Democratic Republic (East Germany)</b>	<b>GDR</b>	<b>265</b>
Germany (German Federal Republic (West Germany))	<b>GFR</b>	<b>260</b>
Ghana	GHA	452
<b>Great Britain (see United Kingdom)</b>		
Greece	GRC	350
Grenada	GRN	055

<b>NAME</b>	<b>CODE NAME (ACTOR)</b>	<b>NUMBER (CRACID)</b>
Guatemala	GUA	090
Guinea	GUI	438
Guinea Bissau	GNB	404
Guyana	GUY	110
Haiti	HAI	041
Hijaz (Hejaz)	HIJ	671
Honduras	HON	091
Hungary	HUN	310
Iceland	ICE	395
India	IND	750
Indonesia	INS	850
Iran	IRN	630
Iraq	IRQ	645
Ireland (Eire)	IRE	205
Israel	ISR	666
Italy	ITA	325
Ivory Coast (see Cote D'Ivoire)		
Jamaica	JAM	051
Japan	JPN	740
Jordan	JOR	663
Kazakhstan	KZK	705
Kenya	KEN	501
Korea	KOR	730
North Korea (People's Republic of Korea)	PRK	731
South Korea (Republic of Korea)	ROK	732
Kuwait	KUW	690
Kyrgyz Republic	KYR	703
Laos	LAO	812
Latvia	LAT	367
Lebanon	LEB	660
Lesotho	LES	570
Liberia	LBR	450
Libya	LIB	620
Liechtenstein	LIE	223
Lithuania	LIT	368
Luxemburg	LUX	212
Macedonia	MAC	343
Madagascar (Malagasy Republic)	MAG	580
Malawi	MAW	553
Malaysia	MAL	820
Maldives	MAD	781
Mali	MLI	432
Malta	MLT	338
	<b>CODE</b>	

<b>NAME</b>	<b>NAME (ACTOR)</b>	<b>NUMBER (CRACID)</b>
<b>Marshall Islands</b>	<b>MSI</b>	<b>983</b>
<b>Mauritania</b>	<b>MAA</b>	<b>435</b>
<b>Mauritius</b>	<b>MAS</b>	<b>590</b>
<b>Mexico</b>	<b>MEX</b>	<b>070</b>
<b>Moldova</b>	<b>MLD</b>	<b>359</b>
<b>Monaco</b>	<b>MNC</b>	<b>221</b>
<b>Mongolia</b>	<b>MON</b>	<b>712</b>
<b>Morocco</b>	<b>MOR</b>	<b>600</b>
<b>Mozambique</b>	<b>MZM</b>	<b>541</b>
<b>Myanmar (Burma)</b>	<b>MYA</b>	<b>775</b>
<b>Najd (Nejd)</b>	<b>NAJ</b>	<b>672</b>
<b>Namibia</b>		
<b>(South West Africa)</b>	<b>NAM</b>	<b>565</b>
<b>Nepal</b>	<b>NEP</b>	<b>790</b>
<b>Netherlands</b>	<b>NTH</b>	<b>210</b>
<b>New Zealand</b>	<b>NEW</b>	<b>920</b>
<b>Nicaragua</b>	<b>NIC</b>	<b>093</b>
<b>Niger</b>	<b>NIR</b>	<b>436</b>
<b>Nigeria</b>	<b>NIG</b>	<b>475</b>
<b>Norway</b>	<b>NOR</b>	<b>385</b>
<b>Oman</b>	<b>OMA</b>	<b>698</b>
<b>Pakistan</b>	<b>PAK</b>	<b>770</b>
<b>Palau</b>	<b>PAL</b>	<b>986</b>
<b>Panama</b>	<b>PAN</b>	<b>095</b>
<b>Papua and New Guinea</b>	<b>PNG</b>	<b>910</b>
<b>Paraguay</b>	<b>PAR</b>	<b>150</b>
<b>Peru</b>	<b>PER</b>	<b>135</b>
<b>Philippines</b>	<b>PHI</b>	<b>840</b>
<b>Poland</b>	<b>POL</b>	<b>290</b>
<b>Portugal</b>	<b>POR</b>	<b>235</b>
<b>Qatar</b>	<b>QAT</b>	<b>694</b>
<b>Rhodesia</b>		
<b>(see Zimbabwe)</b>		
<b>Rumania</b>	<b>RUM</b>	<b>360</b>
<b>Russia (Soviet Union)</b>	<b>RUS</b>	<b>365</b>
<b>Rwanda</b>	<b>RWA</b>	<b>517</b>
<b>San Marino</b>	<b>SNM</b>	<b>331</b>
<b>Sao Tome-Principe</b>	<b>STP</b>	<b>403</b>
<b>Saudi Arabia</b>	<b>SAU</b>	<b>670</b>
<b>Senegal</b>	<b>SEN</b>	<b>433</b>
<b>Serbia (see Yugoslavia)</b>		
<b>Seychelles</b>	<b>SEY</b>	<b>591</b>
<b>Sierra Leone</b>	<b>SIE</b>	<b>451</b>
<b>Singapore</b>	<b>SIN</b>	<b>830</b>
<b>Slovakia</b>	<b>SLO</b>	<b>317</b>
<b>Slovenia</b>	<b>SLV</b>	<b>349</b>
<b>Solomons</b>	<b>SOL</b>	<b>940</b>
<b>Somalia</b>	<b>SOM</b>	<b>520</b>
<b>Somalia Fr.</b>		

**CODE**

<b>NAME</b>	<b>NAME (ACTOR)</b>	<b>NUMBER (CRACID)</b>
(see Djibouti)		
South Africa	SAF	560
South West Africa (see Namibia)		
Spain	SPN	230
Spanish Sahara (see Western Sahara)		
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	SRI	780
St. Kitts-Nevis	SKN	060
St. Lucia	SLU	056
St. Vincent & The Grenadines	SVG	057
Sudan	SUD	625
Surinam	SUR	115
Swaziland	SWA	572
Sweden	SWD	380
Switzerland	SWZ	225
Syria	SYR	652
Taiwan (China-Taiwan- Formosa)	TAW	713
Tajikistan	TAJ	702
Tanzania	TAZ	510
Thailand	THI	800
Tibet	TBT	711
Togo	TOG	461
Trinidad & Tobago	TRI	052
Tunisia	TUN	616
Turkey	TUR	640
Turkmenistan	TKM	701
Uganda	UGA	500
Ukraine	UKR	369
Upper Volta (see Burkina Faso)		
United Arab Emirates	UAE	696
United Kingdom (Great Britain)	UKG	200
USA	USA	002
USSR (see Russia)		
Uruguay	URU	165
Uzbekistan	UZB	704
Vanuatu	VAN	935
Venezuela	VEN	101
Vietnam, Democratic Republic of (North Vietnam)	DRV	816
Vietnam, Republic of (South Vietnam)	RVN	817
	<b>CODE</b>	

<b>NAME</b>	<b>NAME (ACTOR)</b>	<b>NUMBER (CRACID)</b>
<b>Western Sahara (Spanish Sahara)</b>	<b>SPA</b>	<b>605</b>
<b>Western Samoa</b>	<b>WSM</b>	<b>990</b>
<b>Yemen (Arab Republic of Yemen) (North Yemen)</b>	<b>YEM</b>	<b>678</b>
<b>Yemen, People's Republic of (South Yemen)</b>	<b>YPR</b>	<b>680</b>
<b>Yugoslavia (Serbia)</b>	<b>YUG</b>	<b>345</b>
<b>Zambia</b>	<b>ZAM</b>	<b>551</b>
<b>Zanzibar</b>	<b>ZAN</b>	<b>511</b>
<b>Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)</b>	<b>ZIM</b>	<b>552</b>

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#	Name
1	Trigger to Foreign Policy Crisis (TRIGGR)
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3	Triggering Entity (TRIGENT)
4	External or Internal Trigger (TRIGLOC)
5	Perceived External Source of Threat to Values (SOUTHV)
6	Source of Threat Power Status (SOUTHPOW)
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8	Structure of Decisional Unit (STRCDU)
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12	Elapsed Time Between Perception of Trigger and Major Response (TRGRESRA)
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15	Intensity of Violence (SEVVIO)
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17	Attitude to U.S. Activity (USFAVR)
18	USSR Involvement (SUINV)
19	Attitude to U.S. Activity (SUF AVR)
20	U.K. Involvement (GBINV)
21	Attitude to U.K. Activity (GBFAVR)
22	French Involvement (FRINV)
23	Attitude to French Activity (FRFAVR)
24	Italian Involvement (ITINV)
25	Attitude to Italian Activity (ITFAVR)
26	German Involvement (GRINV)
27	Attitude to German Activity (GRFAVR)
28	Japanese Involvement (JPINV)
29	Attitude to Japanese Activity (JPFAVR)
30	Global Organization Organ Most Active in Crisis (GLOBORG)
31	Content of Global Organization Involvement (GLOBACT)
32	Attitude to Global Organization Involvement (GLOBFAVR)
33	Regional/Security Organization Most Active in Crisis (REGORG)
34	Content of Regional/Security Organization Involvement (REGACT)
35	Attitude to Regional/Security Organization Involvement (ROFAVR)
36	Content of Crisis Outcome (OUTCOM)
37	Form of Outcome (OUTFOR)

- 38 Extent of Satisfaction About Outcome (OUTEVL)
- 39 Escalation or Reduction of Tension (OUTESR)
- 40 Date of Termination of Crisis (TERMDATE)
- 41 Elapsed Time Between Perception of Trigger and Termination (TRGTERRA)
- 42 Elapsed Time Between Response and Termination (RESTERRA)

## II. CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES

- | #  | Name  |
|----|---|
| 43 | Geographic Location of Crisis Actor (ACTLOC)                |
| 44 | Geographic Location of Crisis (GEOG)                        |
| 45 | Distance of Crisis Actor from Location of Crisis (CRACTLOC) |
| 46 | Number of Actors Involved in a Crisis (NOACTR)              |
| 47 | Number of States in System (STAINSYS)                       |
| 48 | System Polarity (PERIOD)                                    |
| 49 | System Level (SYSLEV)                                       |
| 50 | Conflict Setting (PC)                                       |
| 51 | Protracted Conflict Identification Number (PCID)            |
| 52 | Violence Associated with Crisis Actor (VIOL)                |
| 53 | Intra-War Crisis (IWC)                                      |
| 54 | Power Discrepancy (POWDIS)                                  |
| 55 | Great Power Involvement in Crisis (GPINV)                   |
| 56 | Superpower Involvement in Crisis (POWINV)                   |

## III. ACTOR ATTRIBUTES

- | #  | Name   |
|----|--|
| 57 | Age of State (AGE)                                 |
| 58 | Territorial Size of Crisis Actor (TERRIT)          |
| 59 | Political Regime of Crisis Actor (REGIME)          |
| 60 | Duration of Political Regime (DURREG)              |
| 61 | Alliance Capability (ALLYCAP)                      |
| 62 | Global Organization Membership (GLOBMEMB)          |
| 63 | Nuclear Capability of Crisis Actor (NUCLEAR)       |
| 64 | Power Status of Crisis Actor (POWSTA)              |
| 65 | Issue of Crisis (ISSUE)                            |
| 66 | Change in Issue of Crisis (CHISSU)                 |
| 67 | Gravity of Value Threatened (GRAVITY)              |
| 68 | Perceived Threat to Major Power Influence (PETHIN) |
| 69 | Cost of Living (COL)                               |
| 70 | Unemployment (UNEMP)                               |
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- 80 Sources Used for Coding Crisis (SOURDT)

## **PART I - CRISIS DIMENSIONS**

### **Variable: 1**

#### **Name: TRIGGR**

#### **TRIGGER TO FOREIGN POLICY CRISIS**

The trigger or precipitating cause of a foreign policy crisis refers to the specific act, event or situational change which leads decision-makers to perceive a threat to basic values, time pressure for response and heightened probability of involvement in military hostilities. A trigger may be initiated by: an adversary state; a non-state actor; or a group of states (military alliance). It may be an environmental change; or it may be internally generated.

#### **Values and Illustrations**

- (1) **Verbal act** - protest, threat, accusation, demand, etc. (On 15 February 1976 President Idi Amin of Uganda announced that large parts of Kenya and the Sudan historically belonged to Uganda and that Uganda might claim these territories, thereby triggering a crisis for Kenya).
- (2) **Political act** - subversion, alliance formation by adversaries, diplomatic sanctions, severance of diplomatic relations, violation of treaty (The Egyptian and Syrian proclamation of their merger into the United Arab Republic on 1 February 1958 triggered crises for Iraq and Jordan).
- (3) **Economic act** - embargo, dumping, nationalization of property, withholding of economic aid (Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal on 26 July 1956 triggered crises for Britain and France).
- (4) **External change** - intelligence report, change in specific weapon, weapon system, offensive capability, change in global system or regional subsystem, challenge to legitimacy by international organization (Intelligence reports of the construction of a USSR submarine base in Cienfuegos, Cuba triggered a crisis for the U.S. on 16 September 1970)
- (5) **Other non-violent act** - (On 30 June 1961 Kuwait requested assistance from Britain against an expected attack by Iraq, triggering a crisis for Britain).
- (6) **Internal verbal or physical challenge to regime or elite** - incitement by media, proclamation of new regime, fall of government, coup d'etat, sabotage act, terrorism, assassination, riot, demonstration, strike, arrest, martial law, execution, mutiny, revolt (On 25 July 1934 Austrian Nazis killed Chancellor Dollfuss, triggering a crisis for Austria).
- (7) **Non-violent military act** - show of force, war game or maneuvers, mobilization, movement of forces, change of force posture to offensive (The entry of three German battalions into the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936 triggered crises for Belgium,

Czechoslovakia, France, Poland, Romania, the U.K. and Yugoslavia).

(8) **Indirect violent act** - revolt in another country, violent act directed at ally, friendly state, or client state (The PRC bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu, which began on 23 August 1958, triggered a crisis for the U.S.).

(9) **Violent act** - border clash, border crossing by limited force, invasion of air space, sinking of ship, sea-air incident, bombing of large target, large-scale military attack, war (The South Vietnam-U.S. invasion of Laos on 8 February 1971 triggered a crisis for Laos).

### **Variable: 2**

**Name: TRIGDATE (YRTRIG, MOTRIG, DATRIG)**

#### DATE OF PERCEPTION OF CRISIS TRIGGER

When did the decision makers of the crisis actor perceive the trigger to the crisis period? This is identified from the decision makers' indication - in diaries, memoirs, speeches, etc., of the act(s), event(s) or environmental change(s) which they perceived as generating threat, time pressure and the likelihood of military hostilities. If it was not possible to determine the exact day of the perception of the trigger, only part of the date was coded, that is, year and month.

This variable appears on the record as follows: year, month, day (19480515, Israel's perception of a grave threat arising from the Arab attack on the newly-proclaimed state, on 15 May 1948).

### **Variable: 3**

**Name: TRIGENT**

#### TRIGGERING ENTITY

Which entity triggered a foreign policy crisis, i.e., initiated the act which was perceived by a state as creating a threat to basic values, time pressure and heightened probability of military hostilities? In addition to states, crises may be internally-generated or catalyzed by non-state actors. Crises can also be triggered by more than one state (e.g., Germany and the USSR in the Entry to World War II Crisis, 1939).

In the case of a single state as the triggering entity, the country code was assigned. If the trigger was internally generated, it was coded 995. If the triggering entity was a non-state actor (UN, regional organization, OPEC, PLO, rebel forces), it was coded 996. If the trigger was an event involving more than one state - a military alliance or arms deal directed at crisis actor) - it was coded 997.

For the list of country-codes, see Table 1 above.

**Variable: 4**

**Name: TRIGLOC**

EXTERNAL OR INTERNAL TRIGGER

Was the triggering entity external to the crisis actor, or internal?

**Values and Illustrations**

(1) **External entity** (On 11 September 1986, Malawi experienced a crisis as a result of a Mozambique threat to deploy missiles along their border, in the Mozambique Ultimatum Crisis).

(2) **Internal entity** (A crisis for Azerbaijan was triggered on 10 December 1991 when the overwhelmingly Armenien Christian population of the Nagornyy-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (District) voted for independence, in the Nagornyy-Karabakh Crisis).

**Variable: 5**

**Name: SOUTHV**

PERCEIVED EXTERNAL SOURCE OF THREAT TO VALUES

Which entity was perceived by the decision maker(s) of the crisis actor as the source of threat to value(s) which were identified in GRAVITY (below)? Where the trigger was external, the source of threat to values will usually be identical to the triggering entity, as identified in TRIGENT (Variable 3 above) - but not always: (for the U.S. in the 1954 Guatemala Crisis, the triggering entity was Guatemala while the perceived source of threat to U.S. values was "international communism" as represented by the USSR). Where the trigger was internal, the source of threat to values always differs from the triggering entity: the former is a non-state actor and the latter an external state actor (in the Lebanon/Iraq Upheaval of 1958, the triggering entity was anti-regime domestic groups, while the perceived source of threat to Lebanese values was Nasser's Egypt). If more than one state was perceived as an external source of threat to values, coding is for the state perceived as the most threatening (Yugoslavia rather than Albania or Bulgaria for Greece in the 1946 Greek Civil War II Crisis).

**Variable: 6**

**Name: SOUTHPOW**

SOURCE OF THREAT POWER STATUS

This variable assesses the power status of the state or other entity identified as the source of threat.

**Values and Illustrations (see POWSTA below)**

- (1) Small Power
- (2) Middle Power
- (3) Great Power
- (4) Superpower

**Variable: 7**

**Name: SIZEDU**

SIZE OF DECISIONAL UNIT

The decisional unit is not necessarily the formal body designated by a crisis actor's regime to make choices, but rather that body which actually formulates the major response to the crisis trigger, as reported in MAJRES (see Variable 10 below). Thus, the question is how many decision makers participated in formulating the major response. The term "decision maker" refers to political leaders, not bureaucrats or military officers, or any other advisors.

**Values and Illustrations**

- (1) **Small: 1-4 persons** (In the February 1978 Lebanon Civil War II Crisis, Syria employed a small decision-making body).
- (2) **Medium: 5-10 persons** (In the Invasion of Albania Crisis of 1939, Greece employed a medium-size decision-making body).
- (3) **Large: over 10 persons** (Sweden employed a large decision-making unit in the 1952 Catalina Affair).

**Variable: 8**

**Name: STRCDU**

STRUCTURE OF DECISIONAL UNIT

This variable examines the structure of the decision-making unit which formulated a state's major response to its foreign policy crisis.

### **Values and Illustrations**

(1) **Institutional** - cabinet, national security council, revolutionary command council, general staff (In the Munich Crisis of 1938, the USSR, France, Czechoslovakia and the U.K. used institutional decisional units).

(2) **Ad hoc** - special crisis management unit (Belgium employed an ad hoc decisional unit in the Shaba II Crisis of 1978).

(3) **Combined institutional-ad hoc** - altered composition of the institutional organ (In the 1954-55 Taiwan Strait I Crisis, the U.S. employed a combined institutional-ad hoc decisional unit).

(4) **Other**

### **Variable: 9**

**Name: COMLEV**

### LEVEL OF COMMUNICATIONS AMONG CRISIS ACTORS

This variable identifies the highest ranking person with primary communications responsibilities during a foreign policy crisis. These communications are with allies, adversaries or third parties. Where the offices of head of state and head of government are combined, the case was coded head of state.

### **Values and Illustrations**

(1) **Head of state** (In the Czech May Crisis of 1938, communications by Germany and Czechoslovakia were handled by the two heads of state).

(2) **Head of government** (In the Air Rhodesia Incident of 1978, Rhodesia's communications were conducted by the head of government).

(3) **Foreign or other minister** (In the Cambodia/Thailand incident of 1958-59, the Thai Foreign Minister conducted communications for the government).

(4) **Diplomatic representative** (In the Nouakchott II Crisis of 1977, Mauritania's primary communications were the responsibility of its Permanent Representative to the United Nations).

(5) **Bureaucrat** (During their crisis of 1963-64, communications between Dahomey and Niger were conducted primarily by government officials).

(6) **Non-officials**

(7) **Other**

(8) **No communications** (There were no communications between Israel and Libya in the Libyan Plane Crisis of 1973).

**Variable: 10**

**Name: MAJRES**

### CRISIS MANAGEMENT I: MAJOR RESPONSE TO CRISIS TRIGGER

Once the decision makers of a state perceive the act/event/change which triggers its crisis, they will decide on an appropriate response. The major response is that specific action which captures the major thrust of its behavior (the U.S. quarantine of Cuba in the 1962 Missile Crisis). Most of the categories of the major response variable match those of the trigger variable (above).

### **Values and Illustrations**

(1) **No response-inaction** - (On 14 March 1939 Hitler informed President Hacha of Czechoslovakia that German troops had occupied Moravska Ostrava and were poised all along the perimeter of Bohemia and Moravia, and Czechoslovakia surrendered, in the Czechoslovakia Annexation Crisis).

(2) **Verbal act** - protest, threat, accusation, demand, etc. (Following the announcement of the Marshall Plan in June 1947 and Czechoslovakia's initial favorable response, the USSR delivered an ultimatum to the Czechs on 9 July calling for immediate withdrawal from the Marshall Plan talks).

(3) **Political act** - subversion, alliance formation by adversaries, diplomatic sanctions, severance of diplomatic relations, violation of treaty threat to commit economic or military act. (In the Vietnam Invasion of Cambodia Crisis of 1977-78, Cambodia's major response was the breaking of diplomatic relations with Vietnam and the withdrawal of its embassy personnel from Moscow).

(4) **Economic act** - embargo, dumping, nationalization of property, withholding of economic aid (In the Dahomey/Niger Crisis of December 1963-January 1964, Dahomey's major response was the closure of rail and road links to landlocked Niger).

(5) **Other non-violent act** (In the Shatt-al-Arab II Crisis of 1969, Iran reacted to Iraq's demand that Iranian ships passing through the estuary lower their flags, by declaring the 1937 treaty null and void).

(6) **Non-violent military act** - declaration of war, show of force, war games or maneuvers, mobilization, movement of forces, with demand of forces, change of force posture to offensive, military aid (The Japanese response to Soviet occupation of disputed islands in the Amur River Crisis of 1937 was to concentrate troops in the area).

(7) **Multiple including non-violent military act** (In the Trieste II Crisis of 1953, Yugoslavia's response involved the lodging of a formal protest with the U.S. and Britain, the mobilization of military reserves and the movement of warships into the area).

(8) **Violent military act** - border clash, border crossing by limited force, invasion of air space, sinking of ship, sea-air incident, bombing of large target, large-scale military attack, war (On 19 July 1961 French paratroops and other forces launched a military assault against Tunisian position in the Bizerta Crisis).

(9) **Multiple including violent military act** (On 22 November 1970 Guinea responded to an invasion by mercenaries from Portuguese Guinea with force and with an appeal for troops from the United Nations).

#### **Variable: 11**

**Name: RESPDATE (YERRES, MONRES, DAYRES)**

#### DATE OF MAJOR RESPONSE TO TRIGGER

What was the date on which the major response to the trigger was formulated? In the cases of multiple responses, this variable identifies the most important response. If the formulation date was unknown, the date on which it was implemented was coded.

This variable appears on the card-image as follows: year, month, day (19630123, the PRC responded to India's attempt to push the Chinese across the McMahon line by launching a massive attack along the disputed frontier).

#### **Variable: 12**

**Name: TRGRESRA**

## ELAPSED TIME BETWEEN PERCEPTION OF TRIGGER AND MAJOR RESPONSE

This variable identifies the number of days which elapsed between the perception of the trigger and the major response by the crisis actor. The day of the trigger was coded as day 1. If the precise date on either of these was missing, the closest approximation was coded.

**Variable: 13**

**Name: CRISMG**

### CRISIS MANAGEMENT II: PRINCIPAL TECHNIQUE

States employ a variety of techniques to cope with foreign policy crises. This variable identifies the primary crisis management technique used by a crisis actor, as distinct from a specific act, which was the focus of the major response variable (see MAJRES above). Values for this variable are scaled from techniques involving negotiation and mediation through those involving violence.

#### **Values and Illustrations**

- (1) **Negotiation** - formal, informal, bilateral, multilateral, international, diplomatic exchange (Tunisia employed negotiation as its principal crisis management technique in the France/Tunisia Crisis of 1957).
- (2) **Adjudication or arbitration**
- (3) **Mediation** - by global or regional organization, ally, or alliance personnel (In the Pushtunistan III Crisis of 1961-62, mediation on the part of President Kennedy's special envoy brought about the termination of the crisis between Pakistan and Afghanistan).
- (4) **Multiple not including violence** (In the Cod War I Crisis of 1973, Iceland banned RAF aircraft from landing at the Keflavik NATO base and protested to the U.K.).
- (5) **Non-military pressure** - e.g., withholding of promised economic aid (Israel's primary crisis management technique in the Jordan Waters Crisis of 1963-1964 was non-military pressure in the form of a Cabinet statement repeating its determination to carry out plans for using the waters of the Jordan River).
- (6) **Non-violent military** - physical acts (maneuvers, repositioning of forces); verbal acts (oral and written statements by authorized leaders threatening to use violence) (In the Punjab War Scare I Crisis of 1951, India resorted to non-violent military crisis management, in the form of the movement of troops to the Punjab border and to Jammu and Kashmir).

(7) **Multiple including violence** (In the 1964 Panama Flag Crisis, the U.S. employed force, as well as other crisis management techniques, in order to defuse the crisis).

(8) **Violence** (On 26 April 1978, following a rebel advance on the Chad capital of Ndjamena, France airlifted 1700 troops to the area and engaged in heavy bombardment).

**Variable: 14**

**Name: CENVIO**

CENTRALITY OF VIOLENCE

This variable assesses the extent of violence employed by an actor as a primary crisis management technique. This refers to the relative importance which decision makers attach to their use of violence in order to achieve their goals in the context of a specific foreign policy crisis.

**Values and Illustrations**

(1) **No violence** (In the crisis which grew out of the assassination of King Alexander in 1934, neither Yugoslavia nor Hungary employed violence as a crisis management technique).

(2) **Violence minor** - violence occurred but played a minor role relative to other crisis management techniques (Violence played a minor role in Panama's management of its crisis with the U.S. in January 1964 over control of the Panama Canal).

(3) **Violence important** - violence was important, but was supported by other crisis management techniques (Violence was an important crisis management technique for both Syria and Jordan in their Black September Crisis of September 1970).

(4) **Violence preeminent** - violence was the preeminent management technique (Violence was the preeminent crisis management technique employed by China and India in their border crisis of 1962-63).

**Variable: 15**

**Name: SEVVIO**

INTENSITY OF VIOLENCE

For those crisis actors which employed violence as a primary crisis management

technique, this variable indicates the intensity of that violence.

### **Values and Illustrations**

(1) **No violence** (China did not use violence as a crisis management technique following seizure of its territory by the Japanese Kwantung Army in the Mukden Incident of 1931-32).

(2) **Minor clashes** (Israel and Syria engaged in minor clashes in their crisis over the Hula Drainage Crisis in 1951).

(3) **Serious clashes** (In the Taiwan Strait I Crisis of 1954-55, Taiwan and the PRC engaged in serious clashes).

(4) **Full-scale war** (Cyprus and Turkey engaged in full-scale war in their 1974-75 crisis).

### **Variable: 16**

**Name: USINV**

### U.S. INVOLVEMENT

International crises involve various actors, often including one or more of the great powers (1918-1945) or one or both of the superpowers (post-1945). U.S. involvement means any important verbal or physical activity during the crisis for or against the crisis actor in question. If the U.S. was the actor being coded, (9) was assigned. If more than one form of U.S. activity occurred, the most intense was coded.

### **Values and Illustrations**

(1) **U.S. not involved in the crisis being coded**

(2) **U.S. non-intervention or neutrality** (The United States invoked the Neutrality Act in the fall of 1940 during the Balkan Invasion Crisis).

(3) **U.S. political involvement** - including statements of approval or disapproval by authorized and senior government officials (The United States was politically involved in the 1956-57 Suez Nationalization-War Crisis).

(4) **U.S. economic involvement** - e.g., financial aid, or the withholding of aid from an actor (In the 1960 crisis between Venezuela and the Dominican Republic, the U.S. withheld the Dominican Republic's sugar quota).

(5) **U.S. propaganda involvement** - increase in Voice of America broadcasts beamed at a

particular country (The U.S. engaged in propaganda activity during the Poland and Hungary crises of 1956).

(6) **U.S. covert involvement** - (U.S. involvement in the 1979-80 Afghanistan Invasion Crisis was covert).

(7) **U.S. semi-military involvement** - military aid or advisors, without participation in actual fighting (The United States was involved semi-militarily in the Taiwan Strait I Crisis of 1954-55).

(8) **U.S. direct military intervention** - dispatch of troops to Vietnam, aerial bombing of targets or naval assistance to a party in a war (The U.S. was involved militarily in the Gulf of Syrte I Crisis of 1981).

(9) **U.S. crisis actor.**

#### **Variable: 17**

**Name: USFAVR**

#### ATTITUDE TO U.S. ACTIVITY

Was U.S. activity viewed favorably, unfavorably, or neutrally by a crisis actor? If the attitude toward the U.S. changed during the course of a crisis, the attitude which prevailed at the end of a crisis was coded. This variable deals with perceptions held by crisis actors, rather than the entire international community.

#### **Values and Illustrations**

(1) **U.S. activity viewed favorably** (U.S. activity in the 1958 Lebanon/Iraq Upheaval was viewed favorably by Jordan, Lebanon and the U.K.).

(2) **U.S. activity viewed neutrally** (U.S. activity was viewed neutrally by India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch Crisis of 1965).

(3) **U.S. activity viewed unfavorably** (U.S. activity in the Palestine Partition-Israel Independence Crisis of 1947-49 was viewed unfavorably by Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria).

(4) **U.S. inactivity viewed favorably** (U.S. non-involvement in the Formation of UAR Crisis of 1958 was viewed favorably by Jordan and Iraq).

(5) **U.S. inactivity viewed neutrally** (The U.K. viewed U.S. non-involvement in the 1975 Belize

I Crisis neutrally).

(6) **U.S. inactivity viewed unfavorably** (U.S. non-involvement in the Bizerta Crisis of 1961 was viewed unfavorably by Tunisia).

(8) **U.S. crisis actor**

**Variable: 18**

**Name: SUINV**

**Location: Record 2, Columns 45-46**

### USSR/RUSSIAN INVOLVEMENT

International crises involve various actors, often including one or more of the great powers (1918-45) or one or both of the superpowers (post-1945). USSR/Russian involvement means any important verbal or physical activity during a crisis for or against the crisis actor in question. If the USSR/Russia was the actor being coded, (9) was assigned. If more than one form of USSR/Russian activity occurred, the most intense was coded.

See USINV for discussion of values.

### **Values and Illustrations**

(1) **USSR/Russia not involved in the crisis being coded**

(2) **USSR/Russia non-intervention or neutrality**

(3) **USSR/Russia political involvement** (The Soviet Union was involved politically in the 1931-32 Mukden Incident Crisis between Japan and China).

(4) **USSR/Russian economic involvement** (The USSR supplied economic aid to Afghanistan during the 1961-62 Pushtunistan III crisis with Pakistan).

(5) **USSR/Russian propaganda involvement** (The USSR broadcast anti-Iranian propaganda during the Shatt-al-Arab I Crisis of 1959-60).

(6) **USSR/Russian covert involvement** (The Soviet Union supplied covert aid to Algeria and the Polisario guerrillas during the Moroccan March Crisis of 1975-76).

(7) **USSR/Russian semi-military involvement** (The Soviet Union provided military aid to ZIPRA during the Rhodesia Settlement Crisis of 1979-80).

(8) **USSR/Russian direct military intervention** (The USSR was involved militarily in the Afghanistan Invasion Crisis of 1979-80).

(9) **USSR/Russia crisis actor**

**Variable: 19**

**Name: SUFAVR**

**Location: Record 2, Column 47**

ATTITUDE TO USSR/RUSSIAN ACTIVITY

Was USSR/Russian activity viewed favorably, unfavorably, or neutrally by a crisis actor? If the attitude toward the USSR/Russia changed during the course of a crisis, the attitude which prevailed at the end of a crisis was coded. This variable deals with perceptions held by crisis actors, rather than the entire international community.

See USFAUR for discussion of values.

**Values and Illustrations**

(1) **USSR/Russian activity viewed favorably** (Afghanistan viewed favorably USSR involvement in the Pushtunistan II crisis of 1955).

(2) **USSR/Russian activity viewed neutrally** (Cambodia viewed USSR intervention neutrally in its 1958-59 crisis with Thailand).

(3) **USSR/Russian activity viewed unfavorably** (USSR activity in the Palestine Partition-Israel Independence Crisis of 1947-49 was viewed unfavorably by Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Egypt).

(4) **USSR/Russian inactivity viewed favorably** (USSR non-involvement in the Breakup of the UAR Crisis of 1961 was viewed favorably by Egypt).

(5) **USSR/Russian inactivity viewed neutrally** (The U.K. viewed neutrally USSR non-involvement in the 1975 Belize I Crisis).

(6) **USSR/Russian inactivity viewed unfavorably** (The PRC viewed unfavorably USSR non-involvement in the Taiwan Strait III Crisis of 1962).

(8) **USSR/Russia crisis actor**

**Variable: 20**

**Name: GBINV**

U.K. INVOLVEMENT

See USINV (above) for the values of this variable. Data for this variable pertain to 1918-1945 only.

**Variable: 21**

**Name: GBFAVR**

ATTITUDE TO U.K. ACTIVITY

See USFAVR (above) for the values of this variable. Data for this variable pertain to 1918-1945 only.

**Variable: 22**

**Name: FRINV**

FRENCH INVOLVEMENT

See USINV (above) for the values of this variable. Data for this variable pertain to 1918-1945 only.

**Variable: 23**

**Name: FRFAVR**

ATTITUDE TO FRENCH ACTIVITY

See USFAVR (above) for the values of this variable. Data for this variable pertain to 1918-1945 only.

**Variable: 24**

**Name: ITINV**

ITALIAN INVOLVEMENT

See USINV (above) for the values of this variable. Data for this variable pertain to 1918-1945 only.

**Variable: 25**

**Name: ITFAVR**

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ATTITUDE TO ITALIAN ACTIVITY

See USFAVR (above) for the values of this variable. Data for this variable pertain to 1918-1945 only.

**Variable: 26**

**Name: GRINV**

GERMAN INVOLVEMENT

See USINV (above) for the values of this variable. Data for this variable pertain to 1918-1945 only.

**Variable: 27**

**Name: GRFAVR**

ATTITUDE TO GERMAN ACTIVITY

See USFAVR (17 above) for the values of this variable. Data for this variable pertain only to 1918-1945.

**Variable: 28**

**Name: JPINV**

## JAPANESE INVOLVEMENT

See USINV (above) for the values of this variable. Data for this variable pertain only to 1918-1945.

**Variable: 29**

**Name: JPF AVR**

## ATTITUDE TO JAPANESE ACTIVITY

See USFAVR (above) for the values of this variable. Data for this variable pertain only to 1918-1945.

**Variable: 30**

**Name: GLOBORG**

## GLOBAL ORGANIZATION ORGAN MOST ACTIVE IN CRISIS

Global organizations have undertaken active roles in some crises. If more than one organ was active during the crisis, the most important organ was coded, according to the scale below.

### **Values and Illustrations**

(1) **Global organization not in existence.**

(2) **No global organization activity.**

(3) **General/other global organization activity** (In the Punjab War Scare Crisis of 1951 the UN Representative for Kashmir was in the area and had discussions with Indian and Pakistani officials).

(4) **Secretary-General** (During the Cambodia/Thailand Crisis of 1958-59 UN Secretary-General Hammerskjold appointed a retired Swiss diplomat as a mediator).

(5) **(General) Assembly** (During the Suez Nationalization-War Crisis of 1956, the UN General Assembly voted to send an emergency military force to the region).

(6) **(Security) Council** (After sending a fact-finding mission to the crisis area, the Security Council called for an end to the invasion of the Republic of Guinea in November 1970 by mercenaries from Portuguese Guinea).

**Variable: 31**

**Name: GLOBACT**

CONTENT OF GLOBAL ORGANIZATION INVOLVEMENT

This variable identifies the content of global organization activity which was the basis of the coding of GLOBORG (above).

**Values and Illustrations**

(1) **Global organization not in existence**

(2) **No global organization involvement**

(3) **Discussion without resolution** (During the Karameh Crisis of 1968, the UN Security Council discussed the matter but failed to pass a resolution).

(4) **Fact-finding** (During the Burundi/Rwanda Crisis of 1963-64, the UN sent a fact-finding mission to the area).

(5) **Good offices** (In the Mayaguez Crisis between the U.S. and Cambodia in 1975, the UN Secretary-General offered his good offices to settle the dispute).

(6) **Condemnation** (The UN Security Council condemned Israel for its commando raid on the Beirut Airport in December 1968).

(7) **Call for action by adversaries** (In the Nagornyy-Karabakh Crisis of 1991-92, the UN Security Council passed a resolution calling for a cease fire between Armenia and Azerbaijan).

(8) **Mediation** ((Secretary-General Waldheim's mediation efforts in the Moroccan March Crisis of 1975 contributed substantially to crisis abatement).

(9) **Arbitration** (In 1937, the League Council placed Alexandretta under Syrian control and drafted a Statute of Fundamental Law for the Sanjak).

(10) **Adjudication**

(11) **Sanctions** (The League of Nations adopted a resolution to maintain an arms embargo against Paraguay and to lift it from Bolivia during the Chaco II Crisis of 1932).

(12) **Observer group** (During the Lebanon/Iraq Crisis of 1958 the Security Council adopted a resolution dispatching an observer group to Lebanon to ensure that there was no infiltration across its border).

(13) **Authorization of military force by members** - cases in which the organization authorized the use of force by member states to enforce a resolution but did not commit organization forces (On November 1990, at US urging, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 678, authorizing the “use (of) all necessary means” by member-states to secure Iraq’s compliance with all its earlier resolutions).

(14) **Emergency military forces** (In July 1960 the Security Council passed a resolution establishing a UN emergency military force for the Congo in the Congo I: Katanga Crisis).

(15) **General/other**

**Variable: 32**

**Name: GLOBFAVR**

#### ATTITUDE TO GLOBAL ORGANIZATION INVOLVEMENT

What was the actor's perception of League of Nations or United Nations activity (or inactivity) during a crisis? If the actor's attitude toward the global organization changed during the course of a crisis, the prevalent attitude at the end of a crisis was coded. World War II cases were excluded.

#### **Values and Illustrations**

(1) **Global organization not in existence**

(2) **Global organization activity viewed favorably** (In the Six Day War of 1967, all actors but Israel viewed favorably UN activity -primarily cease-fire resolutions).

(3) **Global organization activity viewed as neutral or irrelevant** (Security Council discussion was viewed neutrally by the U.K. and Iceland in the Cod War II Crisis of 1975-76).

(4) **Global organization activity viewed unfavorably** (UN activity in the 1963-65 Malaysia Federation Crisis was viewed unfavorably by Indonesia and Malaysia).

(5) **Global organization inactivity viewed favorably** (By France and Libya in the Chad/Libya III Crisis of 1978).

(6) **Global organization inactivity viewed as neutral or irrelevant** (In the Austrian Putsch

Crisis of 1934, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Italy and Yugoslavia viewed League inactivity neutrally).

(7) **Global organization inactivity viewed unfavorably** (By Mexico in the Mexico/Guatemala Fishing Rights Crisis of 1958-59).

**Variable: 33**

**Name: REGORG**

REGIONAL/SECURITY ORGANIZATION MOST ACTIVE IN CRISIS

Regional and/or security organizations, in the geographic area of a crisis or elsewhere, intervene in some crises, autonomously or as the organ of major power activity. This variable identifies the RSO which was most active in a crisis, regardless of form, substance, or alignment. Only post-World War II cases were included.

**Values and Illustrations**

(0) **RSO not in existence**

(1) **No RSO involvement**

(2) **League of Arab States** (During the Palestine Partition-Israel Independence Crisis of 1947-49, the Arab League announced the decision to keep Palestine as an Arab state and to set up an army of volunteers).

(3) **North Atlantic Treaty Organization** (In the Syria/Turkey Border Crisis of 1957, NATO's commander issued a warning to the USSR concerning its intentions regarding Turkey).

(4) **Organization of American States** (During the Nicaragua/Honduras Crisis of 1957, an OAS investigating committee succeeded in getting both parties to sign a cease-fire).

(5) **Organization of African Unity** (In the Kenya/Somalia Crisis of 1963-64, the OAU Council of Ministers passed a resolution calling for steps to settle the dispute).

(6) **Southeast Asia Treaty Organization** (During the Vietcong Attack Crisis of 1961, SEATO military advisors met and issued a communique).

(7) **Central Treaty Organization**

(8) **Warsaw Treaty Organization** (Warsaw Pact forces invaded Czechoslovakia in 1968 during the Prague Spring Crisis).

(9) **Multiple**

(10) **Other**

**Variable: 34**

**Name: REGACT**

CONTENT OF REGIONAL/SECURITY ORGANIZATION INVOLVEMENT

This variable identifies the content of regional/security organization activity during the course of a crisis. Only post-World War II cases were included.

**Values and Illustrations**

(0) **RSO not in existence**

(1) **No RSO involvement**

(2) **Discussion without resolution** (During the West Irian I Crisis of 1957, the NATO Council met but took no action).

(3) **Fact-finding** (In the Dominican Republic/Haiti Crisis of 1963 an OAS fact-finding mission shuttled between the two countries).

(4) **Good offices** (The President of the Union Africaine et Malgache offered his good offices in the Dahomey/Niger Crisis of 1963-64).

(5) **Condemnation** (The OAS passed a resolution condemning the Dominican Republic in its 1960 crisis with Venezuela).

(6) **Call for action** (During the Indonesian Independence III Crisis of 1948-49 the Arab League passed a resolution calling for Dutch acceptance of a cease-fire).

(7) **Mediation** (In the Black September Crisis of 1970 the Arab League played a mediating role in producing a cease-fire between Jordan and Syria).

(8) **Arbitration** (The OAS arbitrated the dispute between Honduras and El Salvador in the Football War of 1969).

(9) **Adjudication**

(10) **Sanctions** (In the Soviet Bloc/Yugoslavia Crisis of 1949, the COMECON imposed sanctions on Yugoslavia).

(11) **Observer group** (The League of Arab States adopted a resolution to supervise the implementation of a cease-fire between North and South Yemen in 1979).

(12) **Emergency military force** (In the Dominican Republic Crisis of 1965 an OAS Resolution called for the dispatch of an Inter-American Peace Force to the Dominican Republic).

(13) **Multiple activity** (In the Berlin Wall Crisis of 1961 Khrushchev's demand for a settlement elicited NATO consultations and WTO endorsement).

(14) **General/other**

**Variable: 35**

**Name: ROFAVR**

ATTITUDE TO REGIONAL/SECURITY ORGANIZATION INVOLVEMENT

Was regional/security organization activity (or inactivity) viewed favorably by a crisis actor? If the attitude of an actor toward an RSO changed during the course of a crisis, the attitude prevalent at the end of the crisis was coded. Only post-World War II cases were included.

**Values and Illustrations**

(0) **RSO not in existence**

(1) **RSO activity viewed favorably** (A League of Arab States resolution calling for a cease-fire and the formation of a follow-up committee to supervise its implementation was viewed favorably by North and South Yemen in their 1979 crisis).

(2) **RSO activity viewed as neutral or irrelevant** (NATO's call to Turkey and Greece to exercise restraint in the 1976 Aegean Sea Crisis was viewed neutrally by Greece).

(3) **RSO activity viewed unfavorably** (A 1955 OAS plan for demilitarized zones during the Costa Rica/Nicaragua II Crisis was viewed unfavorably by Nicaragua).

(4) **RSO inactivity viewed favorably** (Guatemala viewed favorably OAS inactivity in its 1958-59 Fishing Rights Crisis with Mexico).

(5) **RSO inactivity viewed as neutral or irrelevant** (Regional organization inactivity in the

Trieste II Crisis of 1953 was viewed neutrally by Yugoslavia and Italy).

(6) **RSO inactivity viewed unfavorably** (Greece protested NATO's inactivity in its 1974-75 Cyprus III Crisis with Turkey by withdrawing its forces from NATO).

**Variable: 36**

**Name: OUTCOM**

### CONTENT OF CRISIS OUTCOME

This variable deals with the content of crisis termination. Did a crisis actor yield? Did it triumph? Was a compromise reached? Was there a blurred outcome regarding goal achievement? The outcome is indicated from the perspective of a specific actor. The values which fall under the categories listed below should be thought of in terms of achievement/non-achievement of basic goal(s) by a crisis actor in the context of a specific crisis.

#### **Values and Illustrations**

(1) **Victory** - achievement of basic goal(s); the crisis actor defeated a threatening adversary by counter-threats (The U.S., Britain and France perceived victory in the Berlin Blockade Crisis of 1948-49).

(2) **Compromise** - partial achievement of basic goal(s) (The outcome of the War of Attrition Crisis of 1969-70 was perceived as a compromise by Egypt, Israel and the USSR).

(3) **Stalemate** - no effect on basic goal(s); no clear outcome to the crisis; no change in the situation (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and Yemen all viewed the outcome of the first Yemen War Crisis of 1962-63 as a stalemate).

(4) **Defeat** - non-achievement of basic goal(s); the crisis actor yielded or surrendered when an adversary threatened basic values (Pakistan viewed the outcome of the Bangladesh Crisis of 1971 as a defeat).

(5) **Other**

**Variable: 37**

**Name: OUTFOR**

### FORM OF OUTCOME

This variable refers to the form of the outcome of a crisis at its termination point.

### **Values and Illustrations**

- (1) **Formal agreement - voluntary**
- (2) **Semi-formal agreement - voluntary**
- (3) **Tacit understanding**
- (4) **Unilateral - self**
- (5) **Unilateral - ally**
- (6) **Unilateral - adversary**
- (7) **Compliance**
- (8) **Imposed - imposer**
- (9) **Imposed - imposee**
- (10) **Spillover**
- (11) **Other - global organization intervention**
- (12) **Other - ally**
- (13) **Other - internal or non-state actor**
- (14) **Other - misc.**
- (15) **Faded**
- (99) **Missing data**

**Variable: 38**

**Name: OUTEVL**

### EXTENT OF SATISFACTION ABOUT OUTCOME

This variable reports the extent of satisfaction with the outcome as perceived by the individual crisis actor. In crises where there were several adversaries with mixed reactions, the perceived evaluation of outcome of the principal adversary was coded.

### **Values and Illustrations**

- (1) **All parties satisfied with content of outcome** (In the Shanghai Crisis of 1932, Japan and China perceived that both parties were satisfied with the outcome).
- (2) **Crisis actor satisfied, adversaries dissatisfied** (The USSR was satisfied and perceived Hungary as dissatisfied with the outcome of the Hungarian Uprising of 1956).
- (3) **Adversaries satisfied, crisis actor dissatisfied** (The USSR and China were dissatisfied and perceived the other as satisfied in the Ussuri River Crisis of 1969).

(4) **All parties dissatisfied** (Uganda and Tanzania both perceived that they and their adversary were dissatisfied with the outcome of their 1971 crisis).

**Variable: 39**

**Name: OUTESR**

#### ESCALATION OR REDUCTION OF TENSION

This variable assesses the effect of the outcome of a crisis on the tension level among the adversaries.

#### **Values and Illustrations**

(1) **Tension escalation** - crisis recurred among the principal adversaries during the subsequent five-year period (The Gaza Raid-Czech Arms Crisis of 1955-56 between Israel and Egypt was followed in October 1956 by the Suez-Sinai Crisis).

(2) **Tension reduction** - crisis did not recur among the principal adversaries during the subsequent five-year period (The Panama Flag Crisis of 1964 involving the U.S. and Panama was not followed by a subsequent crisis between these adversaries within five years).

(3) **Recent case**

**Variable: 40**

**Name: TERMDATE ((YRTERM, MOTERM, DATERM))**

#### DATE OF TERMINATION OF CRISIS

What was the date on which the crisis terminated? This is identified from the decision makers' indication - in diaries, memoirs, speeches, etc. - of the date that their perception of threat, time pressure, and war likelihood declined toward the pre-crisis norm. The variable attempts to identify decision makers' perception of decline in tension. When it was not possible to pinpoint the precise day of termination, the month and year were coded.

This variable appears on the card-image as follows: year, month, day (19620129, the frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan was opened thus ending the Pushtunistan III Crisis).

**Variable: 41**

**Name: TRGTERRA**

**ELAPSED TIME BETWEEN PERCEPTION OF TRIGGER AND TERMINATION**

This variable identifies the number of days which elapsed between the perception of the trigger and the date of termination for the crisis actor. The day of the trigger was coded as day 1. If the precise day on either of these is missing, the closest approximation is coded.

**Variable: 42**

**Name: RESTERRA**

**ELAPSED TIME BETWEEN RESPONSE AND TERMINATION**

This variable identifies the number of days which elapsed between the major response of the crisis actor and the perception of termination of the crisis. The day of the response was coded as day 1. If the precise day on either of these is missing, the closest approximation is coded.

**PART II - CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES**

**Variable: 43**

**Name: ACTLOC**

**GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF CRISIS ACTOR**

What was the geographic location of the crisis actor?

**Values**

- (9) **Central Asia**
- (11) **East Asia**
- (12) **South-East Asia**
- (13) **South Asia**
- (15) **Middle East**
- (20) **West Africa**
- (21) **North Africa**
- (22) **East Africa**
- (23) **Southern Africa**
- (24) **Central Africa**

- (30) **Euro-Asia**
- (31) **East Europe**
- (32) **Central Europe**
- (33) **West Europe**
- (34) **North Europe**
- (35) **South Europe**
- (41) **North America**
- (42) **Central America**
- (43) **South America**
- (51) **Australasia**

**Variable: 44**

**Name: GEOG**

GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF CRISIS

What was the geographic location of the crisis for the crisis actor?

**Values**

See ACTLOC (Variable #43 above).

**Variable: 45**

**Name: CRACTLOC**

DISTANCE OF CRISIS ACTOR FROM LOCATION OF CRISIS

What was the distance of the crisis actor from the international crisis?

**Values**

- (1) **Home territory** (In the Palestine Partition-Israel Independence Crisis of 1947-49, the crisis for Israel took place on its home territory).
- (2) **Sub-region** (For Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, the Austrian Putsch Crisis of 1934 took place in their sub-region).
- (3) **Same continent** (The Berlin Wall Crisis of 1961, for the USSR, took place on the same continent).

(4) **Elsewhere** (The Korean War I Crisis of 1950, for the United States, took place "elsewhere").

**Variable: 46**

**Name: NOACTR**

NUMBER OF ACTORS INVOLVED IN A CRISIS

How many states were perceived by the crisis actor to be involved in the crisis, including the crisis actor being coded? Where objective evidence existed of substantial involvement without an articulated perception by the crisis actor, that state was included as well. Substantial involvement refers to any one of the following types of activity: direct military; semi-military; covert; economic, and political other than mere statements of approval or disapproval by officials.

**Variable: 47**

**Name: STAINSYS**

NUMBER OF STATES IN SYSTEM

This variable reports the number of nation-states in the system at the time of the crisis. Coding of this variable matches that of the Correlates of War Project.

**Variable: 48**

**Name: PERIOD**

SYSTEM POLARITY

For each crisis actor, this variable identifies the overall power structure of the international system, that is, its polarity.

**Values**

(1) **Multipolarity** - referring to several power centers, characterizing the global system for much of the 19th and 20th centuries. For purposes of this coding, the relevant period is 1918-1939.

During this period, several relatively equal great powers shaped the pattern of relations in the system - France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States.

(2) **World War II** - (1939-1945) was essentially a continuation of multipolarity in terms of system structure. It is designated a separate system-period because almost all crisis actors during those years were participants in a prolonged war, and almost all crises were of the intra-war type (see IWC, Variable #51 below).

(3) **Bipolarity** - A structure with two overwhelming centers of military power, an enduring trait of the global system since 1945, though with several phases: embryonic bipolarity from 1945 to 1948, before domination by the U.S. and the USSR fully matured; tight bipolarity from 1948 to 1956, with most states linked to the two hostile centers of power and decision in world politics and loose bipolarity from 1956 to 1962, when rigid blocs led by the two superpowers experienced intense internal pressures and defections.

(4) **Polycentrism** - The system-period from 1963 to 1989, which witnessed the diffusion of decision among actors in world politics, with the persistence of two preeminent world powers. As such, it combines features of both bipolarity and multipolarity.

(5) **Unipolarity** - With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of republics among the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), has evolved from polycentrism to something akin to unipolarity, with the U.S. as the dominant power. 1990 - .

#### **Variable: 49**

**Name: SYSLEV**

#### SYSTEM LEVEL

Every actor-case can be located in one of two system levels.

#### **Values**

(1) **Subsystem** - crises for states within a subsystem without the direct participation of any major power, or crises in which the principal crisis actors and issues are lesser powers with a predominantly regional focus, but where there is some spillover to the dominant system, usually as the result of the participation of one or more of the major powers (e.g., the Angola Crisis of 1975-76).

(2) **Dominant system** - comprising the Europe-centered great power complex of the 1930s, with the U.S. and Japan as members (e.g., the crises for Britain, Czechoslovakia, France and the Soviet Union in the Munich Crisis of 1938), and the mainly dominant system, where crisis

interactions among major powers have spillover effects on one or more subsystems and their state actors (e.g., the crisis for Britain, France, Egypt, Israel, the U.S. and the USSR over Suez-Sinai in 1956-57).

**Variable: 50**

**Name: PC**

### CONFLICT SETTING

This variable identifies the conflict setting of the crisis for the crisis actor.

#### **Values and Illustrations**

(1) **Non-protracted conflict** - a setting in which an external crisis for an individual state is unburdened by long-term hostility with one or more adversary states (the Cod War Crisis of 1973 for the U.K. and Iceland).

(2) **Protracted conflict** - an environment of ongoing disputes among adversaries, with fluctuating interaction ranging from violence to near-tranquillity, multiple issues and spillover effects on all aspects of their relations, and the absence of mutually-recognized or anticipated termination (the Arab-Israeli conflict, 1947-).

(3) **Long-war protracted conflict** - a setting of protracted conflict in which war is pervasive and continuous (Vietnam 1964-75).

**Variable: 51**

**Name: PCID**

### PROTRACTED CONFLICT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER

Each actor case is identified by a protracted conflict number, according to the values below. Non-protracted conflicts are coded (0).

#### *Africa*

##### ***PC Number***

- (1) Angola
- (2) Chad/Libya
- (3) Ethiopia/Somalia
- (4) Rhodesia
- (5) Western Sahara

(35) DRC (Zaire)-Rwanda

***Americas***

***PC Number***

- (6) Costa Rica/Nicaragua
- (7) Ecuador/Peru
- (8) Honduras/Nicaragua

***Asia***

***PC Number***

- (9) Afghanistan/Pakistan
- (10) China/Japan
- (11) China/Vietnam
- (12) India/Pakistan
- (13) Indochina
- (14) Indonesia
- (15) Korea
- (34) North Korea Nuclear

***Europe***

***PC Number***

- (16) Czechoslovakia/Germany
- (17) Finland/Russia
- (18) France/Germany
- (19) Italy/Albania/Yugoslavia
- (20) Lithuania/Poland
- (21) Poland/Russia
- (33) Yugoslavia
- (36) Georgia/Russia

***Middle East***

***PC Number***

- (23) Arab/Israel
- (24) Iran/Iraq
- (25) Iraq/Kuwait
- (26) Yemen

***Multiregional***

***PC Number***

- (27) East/West
- (28) Greece/Turkey
- (29) Iran/USSR
- (30) Taiwan Strait
- (31) World War II
- (32) Iraq Regime

**Variable: 52**

**Name: VIOL**

VIOLENCE ASSOCIATED WITH CRISIS ACTOR

This variable identifies the extent of violence experienced by a crisis actor, regardless of its use or non-use as a crisis management technique.

**Values and Illustrations**

- (1) No violence (In the Ecuador/Peru Border IV Crisis of 1991, neither Ecuador nor Peru experienced violence during any phase of the crisis).
- (2) Minor clashes (In the Persian Border Crisis of 1920-21, both Russia and Persia experienced minor clashes in the Caspian Seaport).
- (3) Serious clashes (In the Qalqilya Crisis of 1956, Israeli retaliatory raids into Jordan resulted in serious clashes between the two countries).
- (4) Full-scale war (In the Gulf War Crisis of 1990-91, the following states experienced full-scale war: Kuwait, USA, Egypt, France, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the U.K.).

**Variable: 53**

**Name: IWC**

INTRA-WAR CRISIS

An international crisis may occur in a pre-war, post-war, or war setting. The last,

referred to as intra-war crises, share with all other actor level crises two fundamental conditions: a situational change which stimulates a perceived threat to basic values and perceived finite time for response among the highest level decision makers of a state. The third necessary condition, namely, a perceived high probability of involvement in military hostilities, is replaced at the actor level by a perceived adverse change in the military balance as a consequence of the environmental change.

### **Values and Illustrations**

#### **(1) Not IWC**

**(2) Entry of a major actor into an ongoing war** (Military campaigns in the Middle East by Germany and Italy triggered intra-war crises for Britain and Vichy France in 1941).

**(3) Perceived high probability of a major actor entering a war** (Israel's crisis in early November 1956 arose from the Soviet threat to intervene in the Suez Nationalization-War).

#### **(4) Exit of a major actor**

**(5) Perceived high probability of major power exiting a war** (On 23 October 1972 South Vietnam learned of agreements reached between the U.S. and North Vietnam [the Paris Accords], which could have resulted in the exit of the U.S. from the War - in the Christmas Bombing Crisis).

**(6) Technological escalation of a war** (German aerial bombing of the U.K. in 1940 constituted the Battle of Britain intra-war crisis).

**(7) Major non-technological escalation** (On 30 March 1972 North Vietnam launched a spring offensive, initiating the Vietnam-Ports Mining intra-war crisis).

**(8) Defeat in a significant battle** (The Soviet defeat of the German Army at the Battle of Stalingrad triggered an IWC for Germany).

**(9) Internal deterioration** (In March 1944 Hungarian leaders perceived that German troops massing on its borders were about to occupy Hungary).

#### **(10) Other**

**Variable: 54**

**Name: POWDIS**

POWER DISCREPANCY

A power score was determined for each crisis actor and its principal adversary (whether or not the latter was a crisis actor) on the basis of the total of six separate scores measuring size of population, GNP, territorial size, alliance capability, military expenditure, and nuclear capability, at the onset of the crisis. The power of a crisis actor and the power available to it from tight alliance partners (if any) - immediately prior to the crisis actor's major response - was then compared to that of its principal adversary or adversaries to create a final power discrepancy score.

**Variable: 55**

**Name: GPINV**

### GREAT POWER INVOLVEMENT IN CRISIS

This scale assesses combined great power involvement in a crisis for the 1918-1945 period. Low involvement includes verbal, political and economic acts. High involvement includes covert, semi-military, and direct military acts (see USINV, SUINV, GBINV, FRINV, ITINV, GRINV, and JPINV above).

#### **Values and Illustrations**

##### **(1) Post-World War II**

**(2) No involvement by any great powers** (None of the great powers was involved in the Bulgaria/Turkey Crisis of 1935.)

**(3) Two or more great powers with low involvement** (Chaco II 1932-35).

**(4) One great power with high involvement, others low or no involvement** (Jehol Campaign 1933).

**(5) Two or more great powers with high involvement** (Saudi/Yemen War 1933-34).

**(6) One great power crisis actor, others no/low involvement** (Haiti Unrest 1929-30).

**(7) One great power crisis actor, others high involvement** (Battle of Britain 1940).

**Variable: 56**

**Name: POWINV**

## US AND USSR/RUSSIA JOINT INVOLVEMENT IN CRISIS

This variable assesses combined U.S. and USSR (or Russia after 1991) involvement in crises for the post-World War II period. The U.S. and the USSR were superpowers from 1945-1989. Thereafter, the U.S. was the sole superpower. However, we continue to code joint U.S. and USSR (later Russian) involvement in crises because Russia remained, by virtue of its nuclear stockpile, the second power in the global system. Low level includes verbal, political and economic acts. High involvement includes covert, semi-military, and direct military acts.

This variable replaces SPINV in earlier releases of the ICB datasets.

### **Values and Illustrations**

- (1) **Pre-1945**
- (2) **Both powers no involvement, or one low, other no involvement** (Trieste II 1953).
- (3) **Both powers low involvement** (Iraq Nuclear Reactor 1981).
- (4) **One power high involvement, other low or no involvement** (West Irian II 1961-62).
- (5) **Both powers high involvement** (Ogaden I 1964).
- (6) **One power crisis actor, other low or no involvement** (Poland Liberalization 1956).
- (7) **One power crisis actor, other high involvement** (Azerbaijan 1945-46).

### **PART III - ACTOR ATTRIBUTES**

**Variable: 57**

**Name: AGE**

#### **AGE OF STATE**

When did the crisis actor first become an autonomous entity in the modern international system (post-1500), with continuous existence as a sovereign state? For example, Poland was coded as 1920 (4) when it resumed independence after World War II, while states under occupation during that war were coded from the earliest date of their post-1500 independence - Iran (1), Holland (2), Greece (3), Czechoslovakia (4). The USSR was coded as Russia (1) and the PRC as China (1) and Taiwan as (5). Germany was coded from the time of the formation of the German Empire (3), not Prussia; the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) were coded (5).

#### **Values**

- (1) **Pre-1648**
- (2) **1648-1814**
- (3) **1815-1918**
- (4) **1919-1945**
- (5) **Post World War II - 1957**
- (6) **1958-1966**
- (7) **Post-1966**

**Variable: 58**

**Name: TERRIT**

#### **TERRITORIAL SIZE OF CRISIS ACTOR**

The territorial size of the crisis actor, including its colonies, is coded.

#### **Values**

- (1) **Up to 50,000 square miles**
- (2) **50,000 to 500,000 square miles**
- (3) **Over 500,000 square miles**

**Variable: 59**

**Name: REGIME**

### POLITICAL REGIME OF CRISIS ACTOR

This variable distinguishes between authoritarian and democratic regimes, as well as between civil and military regimes, at the time of the crisis. Criteria for identifying democratic regimes are: competitive elections; pluralist representation in the legislature; several autonomous centers of authority in the political system; competitive parties; and a free press. If three or more of these criteria were missing or severely limited, and there was no military component whatsoever, the state was coded as a civil authoritarian regime. A military regime was said to exist when government control was in the hands of the armed forces or when it acted entirely or predominantly at their command. Coding judgments were made in terms of actual practices, rather than constitutional or other formal legal provisions, since the formal constitutional structure gives no guidance as to how a regime works. The following definitions were used as a guide:

Direct military rule: The armed forces exercise direct political control (Pakistan 1958-71, 1977-88, Syria 1949-51, Turkey 1980-).

Indirect military rule: The armed forces determine policy but act through a subordinate civilian government (Argentina 1959-62, Cuba 1933-40).

Dual Authority: The regime rests on the armed forces and a civilian party, organization or group, with the ruler as leader of both pillars of authority (Peron's Argentina 1945-55, Franco's Spain 1939-76).

#### **Values**

- (1) **Democratic regime**
- (2) **Civil authoritarian regime**
- (3) **Military-direct rule**
- (4) **Military-indirect rule**
- (5) **Military dual authority**

**Variable: 60**

**Name: DURREG**

### DURATION OF POLITICAL REGIME

This variable reports the number of years of continuous existence of a specific political authority within the crisis actor at the time of the crisis. The number of years from the last

change of regime until the date of the crisis is reported. Some indicators of regime change are: institutionalization of system of government (U.K. Cabinet System 1750);, transfer of power from army to civilian rule and vice versa (by coup, revolution, etc.); qualitative new constitution (France 1958); change of authoritarian leaders (USSR 1953 and 1964).

### **Values**

- (1) **0 - 2 years**
- (2) **3 - 25 years**
- (3) **Over 25 years**

### **Variable: 61**

**Name: ALLYCAP**

#### ALLIANCE CAPABILITY

This variable identifies the type of alliance pattern which existed for the crisis actor at the time of its crisis.

### **Values and Illustrations**

- (1) **Non-aligned or neutral** (Indonesia in the 1963-65 Malaysia Federation Crisis).
- (2) **Informal alliance with superpower or great power** (Israel in the 1973-74 October-Yom Kippur War).
- (3) **Formal alliance with superpower or great power** (Czechoslovakia in the 1938 Munich Crisis).
- (4) **Alliance leader - superpower or great power** (The U.S. and the USSR in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis).

### **Variable: 62**

**Name: GLOBMEMB**

#### GLOBAL ORGANIZATION MEMBERSHIP

Was the crisis actor a member of the then-existing global organization (League of Nations or United Nations) during the crisis? The League ceased to exist on 28 April 1946; the UN was founded 24 October 1945.

## Values

- (1) **Both** - between 24 October 1945 and 18 April 1946
- (2) **League of Nations only**
- (3) **United Nations only**
- (4) **Neither**

**Variable: 63**

**Name: NUCLEAR**

### NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OF CRISIS ACTOR

Did the crisis actor possess nuclear weapons or access to them at the time the crisis began?

#### Values and Illustrations

- (1) **No (foreseeable) nuclear capability** - the actor did not possess a nuclear capability with any operational military significance when the crisis began; moreover, the international consensus at the time was that it could not develop or acquire such capability within five years (sub-Saharan African states).
- (2) **Foreseeable nuclear capability** - the actor could develop or acquire operational nuclear military capability within five years of the beginning of the crisis (India 1971, at the time of the Bangladesh crisis).
- (3) **Possession of nuclear capability** - the actor had nuclear military capability (weapons) and delivery means but no second-strike capability (PRC at the time of the Ussuri River Crisis, 1969).
- (4) **Developed nuclear capability, with second strike capability** superpower or great power with ability to absorb a first strike and retaliate (U.S., USSR at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962).

**Variable: 64**

**Name: POWSTA**

### POWER STATUS OF CRISIS ACTOR

The status of actors in subsystem or mainly subsystem crises was determined by the power status within the subsystem, while the status of those whose crises took place in the mainly dominant or dominant system was determined by their power status in the dominant system.

### **Values and Illustrations**

- (1) **Small power** (Sudan in the Sudan/Egypt Border Crisis of 1958).
- (2) **Middle power** (Poland in the 1956 Poland Liberalization Crisis).
- (3) **Great power** (France and Great Britain in the 1956-57 Suez Nationalization-War Crisis).
- (4) **Superpower** (The U.S. and the USSR in the Berlin Wall Crisis of 1961).

**Variable: 65**

**Name: ISSUE**

### ISSUE OF CRISIS

This variable identifies the most important initial issue area of the crisis as perceived by the crisis actor. In cases of multiple issue-areas, the value closest to (1) was coded.

### **Values and Illustrations**

- (1) **Military-security** - territory, borders, access to the sea, free navigation, irredentism, change in the military balance, military incidents, war (The U.K. and Ethiopia in the 1934-36 Ethiopia War Crisis).
- (2) **Political-diplomatic** - sovereignty, hegemony, international status, change in international system, colonialism, cold war (Venezuela in its crisis with Cuba in 1963).
- (3) **Economic-developmental** - treatment of property, raw material resources, oil, economic recession, economic pressure, currency problems (Jordan in the 1964 Jordan Water Crisis).
- (4) **Cultural-status** - ideology, threat to non-material values, internal problems, state of regime, population problems (Germany in the 1938 Anschluss Crisis).
- (5) **Other**

**Variable: 66**

**Name: CHISSU**

CHANGE IN ISSUE OF CRISIS

This variable identifies any major change in the most important issue-area during the crisis. The issue-area toward which the change occurred is coded.

**Values**

- (1) **Military-security**
- (2) **Political-diplomatic**
- (3) **Economic-developmental**
- (4) **Cultural-status**
- (5) **Other**
- (6) **No change occurred**

**Variable: 67**

**Name: GRAVTY**

GRAVITY

This variable identifies the object of gravest threat at any time during the crisis, as perceived by the principal decision makers of the crisis actor. When two or more values were threatened, the most severe was coded.

**Values and Illustrations**

- (0) **Economic threat** (A crisis for Egypt was triggered in January 1992 when Sudan granted a Canadian oil company a concession to explore for oil in Halaib, in the Egypt/Sudan Border II Crisis).
- (1) **Limited military threat** - (Israel=s raid on the airport in Entebbe on 3 July 1976 constituted a limited military threat for Uganda, in the Entebbe Raid Crisis).
- (2) **Political threat** - threat of overthrow of regime, change of institutions, replacement of elite, intervention in domestic politics, subversion (Nicaragua, Panama, the Dominican Republic and Haiti, perceived threats to their political systems, generated by Cuba-assisted invasions by exiles of these states, in the 1959 Cuba/Central America I Crisis).
- (3) **Territorial threat** - threat of integration, annexation of part of a state's territory, separatism

(Japanese military operations in China as a threat to China in the Mukden Incident Crisis of 1931-1932).

(4) **Threat to influence in the international system or regional subsystem** - threat of declining power in the global system and/or regional subsystem, diplomatic isolation, cessation of patron aid (Egypt's nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 as a threat to the global and regional influence of the U.S. and USSR in the Suez Nationalization/War Crisis).

(5) **Threat of grave damage** - threat of large casualties in war, mass bombings (The PRC build-up of forces in the coastal areas around Quemoy and Matsu was perceived by Taiwan as a threat of grave damage in the 1958 Taiwan Straits II Crisis).

(6) **Threat to existence** - threat to survival of population, of genocide, threat to existence of entity, of total annexation, colonial rule, occupation (Italy's invasion of Ethiopia and the war which ensued, 1934-36).

(7) **Other**

**Variable: 68**

**Name: PETHIN**

#### PERCEIVED THREAT TO SUPERPOWER INFLUENCE

If GRAVITY (above) was coded (4) and the actor coded was a superpower, what type of influence was threatened?

#### **Values and Illustrations**

(0) **Pre-1945 case**

(1) **Not coded as threat to influence in Variable 67.**

(2) **Coded as threat to influence in Variable 67, but not threat to superpower influence**

(3) **Adverse change in global balance** (The U.S. and the USSR in the Berlin Blockade Crisis of 1948-49).

(4) **Decline in superpower influence within its bloc** (The USSR in the Marshall Plan Crisis of 1947).

(5) **Decline in influence with non-bloc client states** (The USSR in the Afghanistan Invasion Crisis of 1979-80).

(6) **Decline in influence with non-aligned group** (Japan in the Marco Polo Bridge Crisis of 1937-38).

(7) **Decline in influence with adversary bloc** (The U.S. in the 1961 Bay of Pigs Crisis).

**Variable: 69**

**Name: COL**

### COST OF LIVING

This and the next five variables attempt to assess the overall state of the economy of the crisis actor at the time the crisis began. Data are examined from the year of the crisis to four years earlier. The coding is of deviations from the normal level relative to the actor. In cases which occurred during the year the crisis actor became independent, there can be no change in levels, hence they are coded (4). In crises which occurred from one to three years after the actor's independence, the most reliable data available were coded.

#### **Values**

- (1) **Significant increase during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (2) **Normal increase or decrease during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (3) **Significant decrease during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (4) **Newly-independent state**

**Variable: 70**

**Name: UNEMP**

### UNEMPLOYMENT

#### **Values**

- (1) **Significant increase during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (2) **Normal increase or decrease during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (3) **Significant decrease during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (4) **Newly-independent state**

**Variable: 71**

**Name: INFLAT**

INFLATION

**Values**

- (1) **Significant increase during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (2) **Normal increase or decrease during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (3) **Significant decrease during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (4) **Newly-independent state**

**Variable: 72**

**Name: FOODPR**

FOOD PRICES

**Values**

- (1) **Significant increase during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (2) **Normal increase or decrease during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (3) **Significant decrease during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (4) **Newly-independent state**

**Variable: 73**

**Name: LABSTR**

LABOR DISRUPTION

This variable includes strikes, systematic absenteeism, labor unrest, etc.

**Values**

- (1) **Significant increase during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (2) **Normal increase or decrease during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (3) **Significant decrease during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (4) **Newly-independent state**

**Variable: 74**

**Name: SHORT**

CONSUMER GOODS SHORTAGES

Where data other than statistical yearbooks indicate shortages despite overall adequacy in production, e.g., export of consumer goods, this variable was coded accordingly.

**Values**

- (1) **Significant increase during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (2) **Normal increase or decrease during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (3) **Significant decrease during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (4) **Newly-independent state**

**Variable: 75**

**Name: ECONDT**

ECONOMIC STATUS OF ACTOR

This variable provides a summary indicator of the economic status of the crisis actor, based on COL, UNEMP, INFLAT, FOODPR, LABSTR, SHORT (Variables #67-72 above). Since there were considerable missing data on a number of these economic indicators, the composite index ECONDT takes advantage of whatever partial information is available.

**Values**

- (1) **Increase in economic problems**
- (2) **Normal economic situation**
- (3) **Decrease in economic problems**
- (4) **Newly-independent state**

**Variable: 76**

**Name: REGREP**

REGIME REPRESSION

This variable assesses the level of repression exercised by the regime of the crisis actor preceding the crisis period. Examples include arrests, exile, deportation, purges, harassment of

political organizations, martial law, restrictions on press freedom. If the crisis occurred less than six months after the actor's independence, it was coded (4).

### **Values**

- (1) Significant increase during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (2) Normal level during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (3) Significant decrease during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (4) Newly-independent state, government in exile**

**Variable: 77**

**Name: SOCUNR**

### SOCIETAL UNREST

This variable assesses the level of societal unrest in the crisis actor as evidenced by assassinations, terrorism, general strikes, demonstrations, and riots.

### **Values**

- (1) Significant increase during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (2) Normal level during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (3) Significant decrease during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (4) Newly-independent state, government in exile**

**Variable: 78**

**Name: MASSVL**

### MASS VIOLENCE

This variable assesses the level of mass violence present within the society of the crisis actor, as evidenced by insurrections, civil war, and revolution.

### **Values**

- (1) Significant increase during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (2) Normal level during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (3) Significant decrease during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (4) Newly-independent state, government in exile**

**Variable: 79**

**Name: GVINST**

GOVERNMENT INSTABILITY

This variable assesses the level of governmental instability in the crisis actor, as evidenced by executive changes, constitutional changes, legal changes, and administrative structure changes.

**Values**

- (1) **Significant increase during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (2) **Normal level during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (3) **Significant decrease during relevant period preceding the crisis**
- (4) **Newly-independent state, government in exile**

**Variable: 80**

**Name: SOURDT**

SOURCES USED FOR CODING CRISIS

This variable provides information on the mix of sources used for coding this actor-case.

**Values**

- (1) **All sources** - including documents, memoirs, chronologies, historical accounts, articles
- (2) **All sources excluding documents or memoirs or articles**
- (3) **All sources excluding documents and memoirs**
- (4) **Chronologies only**